Raghida Dergham: What concessions is Iran ready to make?

If Iranian concessions are to meet the expectations of US President Donald Trump, they will require Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to craft a narrative capable of persuading his base that he has been compelled to drink the “cup of poison” in order to save the Islamic Republic — much as Ruhollah Khomeini did when he reluctantly accepted the ceasefire with Iraq.

The concessions would have to be pivotal, substantive, and profound, beginning with the nuclear file in a genuinely structural — not cosmetic — manner. The missile program would not escape the reckoning. Nor would Iran’s regional proxies. Tehran would be compelled, at least temporarily, to relinquish aspects of its proxy architecture in order to save the proxies themselves. The alternative, particularly in Lebanon, would be that Hezbollah faces military crushing by Israel should understandings fail to materialize.

President Trump operates with a Plan A — negotiation — and a Plan B — military action. Israel, for its part, is preparing its own Plan B, complete with operational scenarios aimed at Iran, while US forces simultaneously reinforce their regional posture. This is coordination, not subordination.

Should an American–Iranian deal become attainable, the difficult bargain would begin with Iran abandoning its insistence on the sunset clause governing the duration of its nuclear commitments. In exchange, Tehran would demand that Washington relinquish the snapback mechanism — the automatic reimposition of sanctions. This would be accompanied by resolving differences over enrichment levels and transparency concerning stockpiles of enriched uranium and related arrangements.

What will not happen is that Donald Trump falls into an Iranian trap and becomes another Barack Obama.

 

Tehran faces two options: Preserve the regime and Hezbollah through negotiated understandings, or risk sacrificing Hezbollah to military destruction should it refuse to compromise.

When Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu traveled to Washington, he carried detailed intelligence intended to persuade the American president that a military strike should be launched now, at a moment when Iranian leadership appears shaken and anxious. He also brought Israeli arguments insisting that ballistic missiles and Revolutionary Guard proxies represent direct threats to Israeli national security.

Netanyahu’s portfolio included maps identifying vital institutions and nerve centers of the regime in Tehran. He presented deep intelligence assessments of the Iranian interior, aiming to calm American fears of chaos and its repercussions, and to reassure Trump that US ground forces would not be required.

Israel does not subscribe to the notion that there is no alternative to the regime in Tehran and therefore that its fall must be avoided. Intelligence circles in Washington and Tel Aviv do not focus exclusively on symbolic figures such as the Shah’s son, recognizing that regime collapse would exceed his capacity — and perhaps that of Iranian society itself — to manage.

The calculation instead centers on the conventional military establishment — the Iranian army — and the possibility that it could assume control should disorder erupt. This could occur through institutional cohesion, or through a faction aligned with civilian leadership that emerged from successive waves of protest, capable of stabilizing the state during a critical transition.

US Vice President JD Vance has stressed that the nuclear issue is the priority. He offered what might be described as a political sweetener when he declared that Iran’s internal affairs belong to the Iranian people — implying that the administration is not seeking regime change in exchange for nuclear concessions. This is political inducement, not binding doctrine.

The vice president’s positioning prepares but does not constrain the president. It leaves Trump ample room for maneuver, and perhaps for strategic ambiguity, at a moment when a countdown has effectively begun between diplomatic talks and military operations.

The camp led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio is explicit in favoring military action sooner rather than later, lest the American president acquire a reputation for retreat or duplicity. In this view — shared by a significant number of military and intelligence officials — missing the present window would amount to strategic folly.

That camp does not confine itself to the nuclear dossier. It insists on missile constraints, proxy curtailment, security guarantees for Israel, and an end to repression inside Iran.

At a deeper strategic level, oil calculations remain central to US dominance over global energy markets and the implications for the economic leverage of China. On the question of proxies, Iranian concessions would necessarily extend to them, beginning in Lebanon.

Tehran faces two options: Preserve the regime and Hezbollah through negotiated understandings, or risk sacrificing Hezbollah to military destruction should it refuse to compromise. Iranian leaders know that the fate of their proxies is endangered either way. A partial and managed retreat could therefore be framed domestically as a painful but necessary act of preservation — another version of drinking from the poisoned chalice.

In Iraq, the US administration has been unequivocal in opposing the return of Nouri al-Maliki to the premiership. Political engineering is underway to ensure internal Iraqi arrangements that prevent confrontation with Washington under the banner of his candidacy. The broader objective is to sever Iranian leverage in Iraq through the battle over leadership.

In Yemen, the equation blends military preparation with diplomatic pressure. The Trump administration intends to curtail Houthi capabilities in Yemen and along critical waterways including Hormuz and the Red Sea. This too provides space for Khamenei to justify concessions under the rubric of national preservation. As for Hamas, the file has effectively slipped from Tehran’s operational control and no longer constitutes a strategic priority, notwithstanding rhetorical commitments to Palestine.

We are therefore at a crossroads between a language of concessions that would spare Iran war and a language of self-destruction should Iranian intransigence invite an American–Israeli strike. Concessions could preserve regime continuity if Khamenei follows Khomeini’s precedent, drinking the cup of poison and presenting it as a sacrifice for Iran — not merely for the regime — in exchange for economic relief that would allow the Iranian people to recover.

If, however, the Iranian leadership persists in strategic delay or tactical procrastination, using negotiations as a tool to erode Trump’s leverage, military action becomes not only possible but imminent — potentially within the timeframe of weeks, perhaps even days.

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Trump has little tolerance for open-ended diplomacy, particularly as domestic electoral dynamics approach. He seeks closure and demonstrable results. Iran has the opportunity to demonstrate seriousness. Should Trump conclude that delay is the governing strategy, a strike would likely follow — perhaps even sooner than publicly anticipated, since surprise remains an essential element of war.

There may well be a distribution-of-roles dynamic between Trump and Netanyahu. The American president benefited from Netanyahu’s visit and departure without securing an immediate strike. He received a comprehensive intelligence briefing, submitted it to US agencies for assessment, and bought time — using his refusal of an urgent strike to cultivate Iranian goodwill, all while retaining full military readiness and integrating Israeli intelligence into American planning.

The current moment is defined by ebb and flow between the military and diplomatic tracks, with a countdown underway toward the military option for which plans are already in place. States across the Middle East and the Gulf have urged caution, warning against the repercussions of either a failed or even a successful strike. Their concern today is that the Islamic Republic could emerge emboldened — like a peacock fanning its feathers — should Trump retreat without extracting decisive Iranian concessions.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Maghrebi.org. Raghida Dergham is a Lebanese-American journalist based in Beirut. She is the founder and executive chairwoman of the Beirut Institute, an independent think tank hosting global events. This article was originally published by Alarabiya.

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