Hafed al-Ghwell: Tunisians are losing hope in their institutions

An ancient Roman poet wrote that rulers could placate the public by providing them with “bread and circuses.” Food satisfies material needs while spectacle diverts political attention. Modern Tunisia, however, presents its people with the opposite conditions: Economic relief is scarce, public entertainment offers little in the way of distraction, and the avenues of political life grow narrower by the month.

A republic once celebrated as the sole (relative) success of the Arab Spring is increasingly drifting toward a place where neither prosperity nor political participation exists to cushion public frustrations.

Tunisia’s post-2011 experiment with pluralism produced genuine achievements: competitive elections took place; civil society thrived; a widely praised constitution emerged in 2014; political compromise between secular and Islamist movements defied expectations across a region where democratic transitions often collapsed quickly.

Economic grievances, however, never eased. Youth unemployment has hovered above 30 percent for most of the past decade. Inequality persists between the coastal north and the neglected interior. Public debt doubled from about 40 percent of gross domestic product in 2010 to more than 80 percent by the early 2020s. Many citizens gradually concluded that democracy had delivered debate but not opportunity.

As the level of political fatigue grew, it created the conditions that ultimately elevated Kais Saied to power as president in 2019. Contrary to much conventional reporting, he did not manufacture Tunisia’s frustrations; he inherited them. His electoral victory reflected a protest vote against an entire political class widely viewed as corrupt and ineffective.

 

A republic once celebrated as the sole (relative) success of the Arab Spring is increasingly drifting toward a place where neither prosperity nor political participation exists to cushion public frustrations.

At the core of those frustrations was intense parliamentary fragmentation that only managed to produce short-lived governments and constant policy paralysis. To some, political parties became the ultimate symbol of stagnation rather than the vehicles for reform promised by the aspirational fervor in the immediate aftermath of the toppling in 2011 of Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali’s 24-year rule.

Saied’s promise of institutional reset easily appealed to voters who believed the system itself had failed. However, the “reset” quickly evolved into a restructuring of the entire Tunisian political order. The suspension of the country’s parliament in 2021 marked the beginning of an extended period of rule by decree.

A new constitution, approved in 2022, concentrated authority in the hands of the presidency and extensively reduced the checks on executive power. Parliamentary elections held under the revised framework produced a turnout below 12 percent in the first round, an extraordinary figure that suggested widespread public disengagement rather than enthusiasm for the new political arrangement.

Tunisia’s once vibrant, multiparty arena now operates under significant pressure, with opposition figures, journalists, and civil society activists constantly facing dubious legal scrutiny and arbitrary detention.

Some would argue that political contraction might have been “tolerable” if economic recovery had followed. However, the Tunisian economy remains weak and growth extremely uneven despite positive indicators. Real GDP grew by about 2.4 percent in the first three quarters of 2025, driven largely by strong agricultural output and a rebound in tourism. Unfortunately, a “recovery” of that scale offers little comfort to a population experiencing persistent job insecurity in an economy buffeted by external shocks.

The national unemployment rate still hovers around 15 percent. The participation rate of women in the workforce remains less than half the rate for men. Employment opportunities remain concentrated in informal sectors or low-productivity industries that net little-to-no public revenues that could help underwrite sustained growth or repair tattered safety nets. Growth therefore generates statistics but rarely transforms daily life.

In addition, external accounts signal additional structural stress. Tunisia’s trade deficit persists, while domestic hydrocarbon production continues to decline. For now, currency reserves remain stable, largely because capital controls restrict outflows, and foreign investment has increased modestly, although total inflows still equal only about 1 percent of GDP.

In the absence of a miracle, the broader Tunisian economy will struggle to grow sustainably, especially given that public finances remain strained. Debt-service costs have surged in recent years, representing more than three-quarters of total government obligations. Intense fiscal pressures complicate negotiations with lenders, while reforms of subsidies risk provoking public anger; bread prices remain politically sensitive in a country where subsidized food has long functioned as a social safety valve.

Such fragility intersects with political contraction in ways that amplify instability. Political systems can survive economic hardships when citizens retain avenues for expressing dissatisfaction. Economic downturns are also manageable when governments retain legitimacy through elections or responsive institutions.

 

A republic without bread tests economic endurance. A republic without circuses tests political patience. Tunisia now lives with the absence of both.

Tunisia currently struggles with deficits of both, simultaneously. As economic frustrations grow while the political outlets for dissent narrow, public reactions are increasingly taking quieter forms: voter turnout continues to fall; street protests occur sporadically but rarely reach the scale seen during the early years following 2011.

Emigration provides an alternative outlet. Thousands of young Tunisians attempt to cross the Mediterranean each year to Italy or other European states. In a way, the peaks and troughs of migration flows now form a silent referendum on Tunisia’s national prospects.

It is unsurprising that European governments now view Tunisia primarily through a lens that focuses on restricting the movement of desperate Tunisians rather than restoring the fortunes of democracy and fostering its consolidation.

A raft of financial agreements with Brussels aims to support border enforcement and limit departures from Tunisian shores in an attempt to stabilize migration flows in the short term. However, the long-term consequences could prove more complicated if economic stagnation continues to push young people toward leaving the country.

Political life in Tunisia therefore continues to occupy a peculiar vacuum. Political mobilization remains constrained. Economic recovery appears modest on paper and highly uneven in reality. Public confidence in state institutions continues to erode. It shatters the expectations of authoritarian systems that have historically relied on economic growth or ideological mobilization to sustain legitimacy; Tunisia currently offers neither engine.

Historical comparisons offer even more sobering lessons. Economic stagnation paired with political contraction often produces unpredictable outcomes rather than orderly stability. Social patience can simmer for years before frustrations erupt unexpectedly; Tunisia’s own revolution in 2011 began with the self-immolation of a street vendor whose personal despair resonated with millions. Political analysts frequently search for structural indicators while overlooking how rapidly public sentiment can shift once a symbolic trigger appears.

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Tunisia was once a symbol of possibility across the Arab world. Political reform, constitutional compromise, and civil society engagement suggested the prospect of a different regional path. Fifteen years later, the optimism surrounding that model has largely evaporated. Economic stagnation eroded public faith in democratic institutions long before political centralization accelerated.

Roman emperors understood the stabilizing power of “bread and circuses”: food eased material anxieties while spectacle redirected public attention. Tunisia now confronts a more precarious equation in which economic relief remains limited and the avenues for political participation grow ever narrower.

Public patience might endure for a time but history offers few examples in which societies were prepared to accept both scarcity and silence indefinitely. A republic without bread tests economic endurance. A republic without circuses tests political patience. Tunisia now lives with the absence of both.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Maghrebi.org. Hafed Al-Ghwell is a senior fellow and executive director of the North Africa Initiative at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC. X: @HafedAlGhwell.

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