Colombian mercenaries expose Haftar–RSF links in Sudan war

The reported arrival of Colombian mercenaries to support Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has drawn renewed attention to a growing cross-border alliance between the paramilitary group and forces loyal to Libyan commander Khalifa Haftar, highlighting how regional networks increasingly sustain Sudan’s war.

According to a UN report cited by AP on April 22nd, a Libyan armed group affiliated with Haftar facilitated the transfer of former Colombian soldiers to areas controlled by the RSF.

The Subul al-Salam Battalion, based in southeastern Libya, is said to have played a central role in moving fighters and providing logistical support, including access to routes, fuel, and infrastructure near the Sudanese border.

The presence of foreign mercenaries fits into a broader pattern in which eastern Libya, areas under Haftar’s influence, has become a strategic rear base for RSF operations.

The Sudan–Libya border has evolved into a key corridor for both licit and illicit flows. Libyan authorities have repeatedly intercepted fuel and migrant smuggling operations along this frontier, underscoring how entrenched these networks have become.

At the same time, Sudanese authorities have explicitly targeted supply routes linked to Libya, accusing external actors of sustaining RSF capabilities through cross-border support.

The relationship between Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) and the RSF appears rooted in mutual strategic and economic incentives.

For Haftar, consolidating control over southern Libya depends on managing cross-border dynamics, particularly smuggling economies and alliances with armed groups.

Engagement with the RSF strengthens his influence over the remote border triangle, an area where state authority remains weak but trade routes are vital.

For the RSF, access to Libyan territory enables it to secure supply lines, move fighters, including foreign mercenaries, and maintain operational continuity despite pressure from the Sudanese army.

This cooperation also intersects with broader regional dynamics. UN discussions on April 22nd highlighted how Libya’s unresolved political deadlock continues to create space for competing external and domestic actors to pursue parallel agendas.

The consequences of this cross-border alignment extend beyond military strategy. Sudanese refugees fleeing the war have increasingly found themselves trapped in Libya, where they face abuse, exploitation, and tightening border controls.

The militarisation of migration routes reflects how conflict dynamics and trafficking networks have become intertwined.

Armed groups operating along the border, some linked directly or indirectly to the RSF or Libyan factions, exercise control over both goods and people.

Sudan’s conflict is not limited to its own territory; behind the shipments of weapons and goods moving from Libya to the RSF are the UAE, which is competing with another regional power, Saudi Arabia, in supporting the Sudanese Armed Forces to control Sudan’s resources and influence over the resource-rich African country.