Libya’s militias and the fragmentation of the state

Since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, militias have become the central actors shaping Libya’s political, military, and economic landscape. The armed groups evolved into semi-institutionalized centers of power capable of influencing governments, controlling territory, managing illicit economies, and obstructing state-building efforts.

The evolution of Libya’s militia system reflects a broader failure to create a unified national army and functioning state institutions after the revolution. Over time, armed groups transformed from revolutionary brigades into political entrepreneurs embedded within Libya’s war economy. Today, militias not only dominate the security sphere but also influence migration routes, oil infrastructure, judicial processes, and the balance of power between Libya’s competing governments.

The roots of Libya’s militia fragmentation predate the 2011 uprising. As noted in the ISPI report Kingdom of Militias: Libya’s Second War of Post-Qadhafi Succession, Libya historically never developed a truly national military institution. Both King Idris and Gaddafi deliberately avoided building a unified army out of fear that it could eventually overthrow the regime. Instead, power relied on patronage networks, tribal loyalties, and elite security formations.

Following the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, this structural weakness became catastrophic. Revolutionary brigades that had fought against the regime refused to disarm, while transitional authorities lacked the coercive power necessary to impose centralized control.

Instead of dismantling militias, Libyan authorities effectively incorporated them into the state apparatus by paying them through ministries and security institutions. This produced “war economy” in which armed groups benefited directly from statelessness and institutional fragmentation.

By 2014, Libya’s political crisis escalated into open civil war. Rival governments emerged in Tripoli and eastern Libya, each supported by different militia coalitions. The conflict increasingly revolved around shifting alliances among armed groups rather than coherent ideological divisions.

The rise of Khalifa Haftar and the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) represented an attempt to centralize military authority under a single command structure. However the LNA itself was not a conventional national army but rather a coalition of tribal forces, local militias, foreign mercenaries, and regional armed factions.

The 2019 offensive against Tripoli marked a turning point. Haftar’s attempt to seize the capital forced rival western militias to temporarily cooperate against a common enemy. Yet the conflict did not strengthen national institutions. Instead, it legitimized militias as indispensable security actors.

The EISMENA analysis, Fragmented Libya: The Reign of Militias, argues that the post-2019 period entrenched militia autonomy even further. Armed groups consolidated influence over ministries, ports, detention centers, and economic infrastructure. Rather than disappearing through integration into state institutions, militias captured those institutions from within. The result was the emergence of what several analysts describe as a “hybrid state,” where formal institutions coexist with informal armed authority.

One of the defining characteristics of contemporary Libya is the fusion between militias and economic power. Armed groups do not merely pursue military influence; they also compete for access to state resources, oil revenues, smuggling routes, and patronage systems.

The SWP paper on Libya’s militias emphasizes that armed groups survive because they are embedded within state institutions rather than fully external to them. Militias receive salaries, exercise influence over ministries, and exploit weak governance structures to protect their economic interests.

This dynamic creates a paradox: the Libyan state simultaneously depends on militias for security while being undermined by them. The militia economy also fuels corruption and prevents meaningful reform. Oil revenues, customs networks, and public-sector salaries are frequently captured by armed actors. As a consequence, militias possess both coercive and financial leverage, making them resilient even during periods of reduced armed conflict.

The fragmentation of Libya’s security landscape has had major regional consequences, particularly regarding migration and trafficking networks across the Mediterranean. Competing armed groups increasingly profit from human smuggling operations. In many coastal areas, militias control detention centers, border crossings, and migration routes. The absence of centralized oversight allows trafficking networks to operate with relative impunity.

Migration has therefore become deeply intertwined with Libya’s militia economy. Armed groups use trafficking revenues to finance operations and strengthen local influence. In some cases, militias simultaneously cooperate with state authorities and criminal organizations.

Another central issue is the culture of impunity surrounding Libya’s armed groups. Militias have repeatedly been accused of arbitrary detention, torture, political intimidation, and extrajudicial violence.

The recent ICC-related reporting demonstrates growing international concern regarding accountability for militia abuses. However, the weakness of Libya’s judicial institutions severely limits domestic prosecutions. The persistence of impunity reinforces militia power in two ways. First, commanders rarely face meaningful consequences for violence. Second, political authorities often avoid confrontation with armed groups out of fear of destabilization.

Rather than existing outside the state, militias increasingly constitute the state’s operational reality. National reconciliation initiatives repeatedly fail because they threaten entrenched militia interests. Militias may formally align with governments or ministries, but their primary loyalty remains local, economic, or factional.

More than a decade after the fall of Gaddafi, militias remain the defining force in Libya’s political order. Their rise was enabled by the collapse of state institutions, historical weaknesses in national military structures, economic patronage systems, and the internationalization of the Libyan conflict.

The Libyan crisis is therefore not simply a conflict between rival governments or regions. It is a structural struggle over sovereignty itself.

ISPI, ESIMENA, SWP Berlin, Maghrebi.org