Filippo Zingone: Migration: the new political battlefield of the modern world

The migrant has become one of the most powerful political symbols of our time. Across continents, from Europe to North America, migration is no longer debated only as a humanitarian challenge or a consequence of global instability. Increasingly, it is presented as a question of security, national identity and social survival. Governments promise stronger borders, faster deportations and stricter controls. Political movements build campaigns around the idea that migration represents a threat that must be contained before it reaches society.

Yet behind the political slogans lies a much more complex reality. People do not move across borders randomly. They move because of war, persecution, economic collapse, political repression, environmental disasters and the absence of future opportunities. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), forced displacement has reached historic levels, with more than 120 million people worldwide forced to flee their homes by 2024 because of conflicts, violence and persecution, and other 117 million people in 2025. The majority of displaced people are hosted not by wealthy Western countries, but by neighbouring states, many of which have far fewer economic resources.

Despite this reality, migration has increasingly become a political battlefield. The central question dominating many governments is no longer simply how to protect people fleeing danger, but how to prevent them from arriving.

The majority of displaced people are hosted not by wealthy Western countries, but by neighbouring states, many of which have far fewer economic resources.

This shift is particularly visible in Europe. The European Union’s Pact on Migration and Asylum,which entered into force in June 2026 after years of negotiations, represents the most significant reform of the European migration system in decades.   

Europe’s new migration paradigm

European institutions describe the Pact as an attempt to create a more balanced framework: one that combines solidarity between Member States with stronger management of external borders. The European Commission argues that the new rules will create faster asylum procedures, improve cooperation between Member States and strengthen measures against irregular migration. However, human rights organizations and refugee protection groups have expressed concern that the new framework places too much emphasis on deterrence and border control.

The UNHCR has welcomed some elements of the Pact, particularly the recognition of the need for greater responsibility-sharing among European countries, but has repeatedly warned that asylum systems must continue to respect international protection standards, including access to fair procedures and the principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits returning individuals to places where they risk persecution, torture or serious harm.

The criticism from organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) is that Europe’s approach increasingly relies on preventing people from reaching European territory rather than expanding safe and legal routes for those seeking protection. The result is a strategy often described as the externalization of borders, Europe’s borders are no longer only located on European soil. They have moved south.

Libya: the new border of Europe

No country represents this strategy more clearly than Libya. For years, Libya has been at the centre of European efforts to reduce irregular migration across the Central Mediterranean. Through cooperation agreements, funding programmes, training initiatives and logistical support, European governments, particularly Italy, have worked with Libyan authorities to strengthen interception capabilities and reduce departures towards Europe.

The logic is straightforward: if migrants can be stopped before reaching European waters, fewer people will arrive on European shores. European governments argue that this approach saves lives by reducing dangerous sea crossings and weakening smuggling networks. However, the policy has faced intense criticism because of the conditions migrants face after being intercepted and returned to Libya.

The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya have repeatedly documented serious abuses against migrants, including arbitrary detention, torture, sexual violence, forced labour and exploitation.

In 2023, the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Libya stated that crimes against humanity may have been committed against migrants and refugees in the country, including through systematic attacks carried out by state-affiliated institutions and armed groups.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has also repeatedly warned that migrants stranded in Libya face extreme vulnerability, while the UN has stated that Libya cannot currently be considered a safe place for the disembarkation of rescued migrants because of the documented risks they face.

Critics argue that when migration control is outsourced to countries where migrants cannot reliably access protection, Europe risks reducing arrivals while moving humanitarian consequences outside its own borders.

Other border, same action. United States and ICE

The Mediterranean becomes quieter. But the crisis does not disappear. It changes location. Across the Atlantic, the United States has developed a different but comparable approach. Migration has become one of the most polarizing political issues in American society, particularly around the southern border with Mexico.

The agency at the centre of this debate is U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), created in 2003 after the September 11 attacks as part of a broader restructuring of American national security institutions. ICE’s mandate includes identifying, detaining and removing individuals who violate U.S. immigration laws. Supporters argue that strong enforcement is necessary to maintain the rule of law and protect national borders.

Critics argue that expanded enforcement powers have produced a system in which migrants, including long-term residents without criminal convictions, can face detention, family separation and deportation proceedings. Organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and Human Rights Watch have repeatedly raised concerns about detention conditions, due process protections and the humanitarian impact of aggressive enforcement policies.

The political debate intensified during Donald Trump’s presidency, when immigration became one of the central themes of his administration. The Trump campaign’s promises of “mass deportation” transformed immigration enforcement from a policy issue into a defining element of political identity. During the 2024 presidential campaign, Trump again pledged the largest deportation operation in U.S. history if elected.

The importance of this rhetoric goes beyond policy. It shows how migration has become a symbol through which societies debate broader fears: economic insecurity, cultural change, national identity and distrust toward political institutions.

A global criminalization of immigrants

Europe and the United States are not alone. Australia built one of the most controversial systems of migration externalization through offshore processing centres in Nauru and Manus Island, where asylum seekers were transferred outside Australian territory while their claims were processed. Human rights organizations and UN experts criticized these facilities for prolonged detention, poor conditions and psychological harm among asylum seekers.

The United Kingdom attempted a similar approach through its agreement with Rwanda, designed to send some asylum seekers arriving irregularly to Rwanda for processing. Although the policy was eventually abandoned after legal and political challenges, it represented another example of a broader trend: wealthy countries attempting to move migration management beyond their own borders.

Meanwhile, European cooperation with countries such as Tunisia and Egypt has followed a similar logic, with financial assistance increasingly linked to efforts to reduce departures. The result is a global transformation. Borders are no longer only physical barriers, they are political systems.

They operate through agreements, security cooperation, detention mechanisms and partnerships with countries that are often themselves struggling with political instability and economic crisis. The central question is no longer simply who crosses a border. It is who controls the space before the border is reached.

When political narratives become social reality: Europe idea of “remigration”

Political decisions rarely remain confined to government buildings. The language used by politicians eventually enters society. The way governments describe a phenomenon influences the way citizens perceive it. When migration is repeatedly presented as a security threat, a cultural danger or a cause of economic decline, migrants themselves risk becoming symbols of problems they did not create. This is one of the most significant consequences of the current global migration debate. The border is no longer only a physical line between countries, it has become a social boundary between communities.

Across different continents and political systems, a similar pattern has emerged: migrants increasingly become the easiest group to blame for deeper structural problems such as unemployment, housing shortages, inflation, insecurity and the weakening of public services. The circumstances are different in Europe, South Africa, Libya and the United States. The mechanism, however, often looks remarkably similar.

In Europe, migration has moved from being a policy issue to becoming a central element of political identity. For many years, the main argument among governments and political parties focused on controlling arrivals: strengthening borders, reducing irregular crossings and increasing returns for rejected asylum seekers.

More recently, however, parts of the political debate have moved further. The concept of “remigration”, originally associated with far-right movements, has entered mainstream discussions in several European countries. The term is used by different political groups in different ways, but it generally refers to the idea of encouraging or forcing people with migrant backgrounds to leave a country, including some who are already residents or citizens.

The concept has become particularly visible in Germany, where the far-right party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) has faced criticism over discussions involving mass deportations and the removal of migrants and people with migration backgrounds.

In France, immigration has become one of the defining issues of national politics, with parties across the spectrum debating questions of integration, identity and security. In Austria, the Netherlands and Italy, political movements have increasingly linked migration with concerns over national culture, public order and welfare systems.

Migration management is a legitimate political question, and many voters express concerns related to housing, employment and public services. The problem begins when a complex social phenomenon is reduced to a simple explanation: that migrants themselves are the cause of social difficulties..

Research by the OECD has shown that migration can have both costs and benefits depending on economic conditions, labour market structures and integration policies. Migrants may place pressure on some public services in the short term, but they also contribute through employment, taxation and demographic renewal. The danger, therefore, is not democratic debate about migration, the danger is when migration becomes a substitute explanation for problems created by broader economic and political choices.

Other case of violence against migrants: South Africa 

South Africa offers one of the clearest examples of how migration can become a target for social frustration. Unlike Europe or the United States, South Africa is not primarily a destination for migrants arriving from other continents. It is a regional hub receiving people mainly from neighbouring African countries, including Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Malawi, Somalia, Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Many migrants are attracted by South Africa’s relatively stronger economy compared with other countries in the region. However, the country also faces profound internal challenges: unemployment above 30%; extreme inequality; poverty; pressure on public services; political dissatisfaction.

In this context, migrants have increasingly become targets of public anger. One of the most visible examples is Operation Dudula, a South African movement that campaigns against undocumented migration and accuses foreigners of taking jobs, increasing crime and putting pressure on services.

Human rights organizations have warned that such narratives can contribute to xenophobic violence. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have documented attacks against migrants and foreign-owned businesses, particularly targeting African migrants.

The tragedy is that many migrants in South Africa are themselves fleeing difficult conditions: economic collapse, political instability or conflict. Yet once inside a country experiencing its own crisis, they can become perceived as competitors rather than fellow victims of regional inequality. The result is a cycle in which disadvantaged groups are placed against one another. Those with the least political power end up fighting each other over resources that remain insufficient because of deeper structural failures.

The attack of migrants by the libyan population

Libya represents another dimension of this phenomenon. The country is both a destination and a transit point for migrants from across Africa and the Middle East. For decades, migrants have arrived in Libya searching for employment opportunities or attempting to continue their journey towards Europe.

But Libya itself has experienced years of instability following the 2011 uprising, the collapse of state institutions and the emergence of competing political and security authorities. Economic hardship, insecurity and weak governance have created social tensions in which migrants increasingly become targets of resentment.

While international attention has focused largely on abuses committed by detention networks and armed groups, there is also a broader social dimension: hostility toward migrants within parts of Libyan society.

The violence that, since the entry into force of the new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, has swept through all levels of Libyan society, where its inhabitants have felt used by European allies as a dumping ground for migrants not wanted in Europe. The response was not a protest against the rulers who readily accepted the new European policies, but rather an outbreak of violence against the migrants themselves. Migrants from sub-Saharan Africa have frequently reported discrimination, racist abuse and violence.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has documented cases of migrants being exposed to exploitation, trafficking and abuse not only by criminal networks but also within wider social environments.

Migration management is a legitimate political question, and many voters express concerns related to housing, employment and public services.

In recent years, Libyan authorities have also carried out campaigns targeting undocumented migrants, including arrests and expulsions. Libyan officials have often justified these measures as necessary for national security and economic stability. However, humanitarian organizations have warned that collective approaches risk punishing vulnerable individuals rather than addressing the criminal networks that exploit migration.

Here again, the political dynamic is familiar. A country experiencing deep political and economic uncertainty begins to see migrants not only as people passing through its territory, but as a symbol of instability itself.

Blaming the results, not fight the cause 

Europe, South Africa, Libya and the United States are very different places. Their histories, economies and political systems cannot be compared directly. Yet the same mechanism appears repeatedly: when societies experience insecurity, migration becomes a convenient place to direct frustration. The migrant becomes the face of unemployment, the explanation for failing services, the symbol of cultural change.

The result is a social conflict between people who often share more similarities than differences: people trying to survive economic uncertainty, political instability and a future they cannot fully control.

The final question is therefore not only how governments manage migration: it is what happens to societies when migrants become the preferred explanation for problems that existed long before they arrived. Every political system needs to decide where to place responsibility.

When societies face difficult moments, economic decline, insecurity, demographic changes or a loss of confidence in institutions, politics often searches for explanations that are immediate, visible and emotionally powerful. Migration has become one of those explanations. Migration affects labour markets, housing systems, public services and political debates. Democratic societies have the right to discuss how many people they can welcome, how integration should work and how borders should be managed.

The danger begins when a complex global phenomenon is transformed into a single cause of social problems. When migrants become the explanation for everything, the political debate moves away from the deeper questions: why are some regions unable to provide security and opportunities for their citizens? Why do wars continue to force millions of people from their homes? Why do economic inequalities between countries remain so extreme? Why do many people feel that their governments have lost control over their future? These questions are more difficult than blaming those who arrive at the border, and politically, they are often less convenient.

One of the central problems in today’s migration debate is that it often begins at the end of the story. The arrival of migrants is visible, the reasons that forced them to leave are often not. A person crossing the Mediterranean, the US-Mexico border or the Darién Gap becomes a political image. The conflict, economic collapse or persecution that produced that journey often remains invisible.

According to UNHCR, the main drivers of forced displacement continue to be armed conflict, persecution and serious human rights violations. Recent years have seen major displacement crises in countries including Sudan, Ukraine, Syria, Afghanistan and Myanmar.

Migration routes therefore represent the final stage of much larger international failures. A boat arriving on European shores is not the beginning of a crisis: it is the consequence of crises that began elsewhere.

The same applies to the United States. A person crossing the southern border is often treated as the immediate problem. But migration from Central America has long been connected to deeper issues: violence, weak institutions, corruption, economic insecurity and the consequences of climate change.

Research by institutions such as the Migration Policy Institute has repeatedly highlighted that migration decisions are influenced by multiple factors, including economic conditions, security concerns and family networks. Reducing migration only to border enforcement therefore risks treating the symptom while ignoring the disease.

Throughout history, periods of economic uncertainty have often produced political movements that identify vulnerable groups as symbols of national decline. Migration debates are particularly vulnerable to this dynamic because migrants frequently occupy a unique position: they are visible enough to become targets, but politically weak enough to have limited influence.

This creates an imbalance. A government can announce tougher policies against migrants and receive immediate political benefits. Addressing housing shortages requires years. Reforming labour markets requires difficult compromises. Reducing inequality requires confronting powerful interests.

Blaming migrants requires only a message and the political narratives have consequences. When migrants are repeatedly associated with crime, insecurity or economic decline, social attitudes can change. Research from organizations such as the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) has shown that migrants and ethnic minorities across Europe continue to experience discrimination, racism and hate crimes. The language of politics does not remain in politics, it eventually shapes society.

The promise behind harsh migration policies is usually simple: close the border; remove migrants; restore security. Countries that have adopted increasingly restrictive policies have often discovered that migration pressures do not disappear. Routes change, smuggling networks adapt, people take greater risks, the humanitarian cost increases. Yet the political demand for stronger barriers continues because the perception of control itself has become politically valuable. A government may not be able to eliminate migration, but it can demonstrate that it is fighting it.

War Among the Poorest

One of the most important questions in the migration debate concerns what happens when people experiencing similar difficulties begin seeing each other as enemies. A low-income worker struggling with rising prices and a migrant struggling to rebuild a life after displacement may appear to compete for limited resources. But both may actually be affected by broader structural problems:insufficient housing investment; weak social protection systems; economic inequality; unstable labour markets;When these issues are reduced to a conflict between citizens and migrants, the debate becomes a competition between groups with limited power rather than a discussion about the decisions that created those conditions.

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In South Africa, for example, unemployed citizens and migrants are sometimes portrayed as competitors for jobs despite sharing many economic vulnerabilities. In Europe, working-class communities affected by industrial decline are often told that migration is the main reason for economic insecurity. In the United States, communities struggling with economic transformation are frequently exposed to narratives presenting migrants as responsible for national decline.

The result is not a solution, it is a redistribution of anger. The frustration remains, only its target is not the power, but the most vulnerable piece of the society. The most dangerous border may not be the one between countries.It may be the one created inside societies between people who are encouraged to see each other as opponents instead of recognizing that many of their struggles come from the same sources.

A society can build higher walls, it can increase surveillance, it can create stricter laws. But none of these measures can replace the difficult work of addressing the reasons why people are forced to leave their homes. And a world that chooses to fight migrants instead of confronting the causes of migration risks winning the battle at the border while losing the larger struggle for stability, dignity and human security.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Maghrebi.org. Filippo Zingone is a freelance journalist who studied Anthropology at Sapienza University, Rome, and works with Il Manifesto, L’Indipendente online, Il Fatto Quotidiano and other Italian publications. Since February 2026, he has also been an editor at Libya Gazette. His work focuses on Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. Through several investigations published by IrpiMedia, he has also covered investigative reporting in Italy.

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