Lahcen Haddad: Morocco’s youth still dreams of emigration
For more than two decades, Morocco has been undergoing a significant transformation of its economy: industrialization, world-class infrastructure, integration into global value chains, improvements in public amenities, the gradual expansion of school enrollment, increased investment levels, and remarkable performance in logistics.
However, the desire to emigrate remains high. According to the 2023–2024 wave of the Arab Barometer, 35% of Moroccans report considering the possibility of emigrating, with a particularly strong tendency among young people and motivations that are primarily economic.
Afrobarometer highlights an even more interesting paradox: the desire to leave can coexist with a relatively positive assessment of the country’s overall trajectory. In other words, wanting to seek better opportunities elsewhere does not necessarily mean rejecting the transformations that have taken place in Morocco.
How can we explain that a significant portion of young people continue to see emigration as a path to personal fulfillment, even as their country is undergoing a major economic and social transformation?
The problem, therefore, is not merely the lack of employment, but the difficulty in transforming educational investment into a credible first entry into the workforce.
The answer cannot be reduced to unemployment, much less poverty. It lies in the interplay between insufficiently inclusive job creation, difficulties in entering the workforce, the poor quality of certain jobs, household vulnerability, an imperfect transition from education to work, delayed independence, regional disparities, and, above all, a growing gap between aspirations and the perceived possibilities for social mobility.
What Unemployment Figures Don’t Reveal: A Broader Crisis in Labor Market Integration
The fundamental question is not merely, “How many jobs are being created?” but rather: what kinds of jobs, where, for whom, and requiring what qualifications? The joint World Bank and HCP study, Morocco’s Jobs Landscape, highlights in particular low labor force participation, especially among women and young people, despite improvements in educational attainment.
The CESE had already pointed out the decline in the employment intensity of growth: the economy produces more wealth without proportionally creating enough jobs to absorb the new generations entering the labor market. This is a primary explanation for the Moroccan paradox: the transformation of the economy is outpacing its ability to channel its benefits into career opportunities accessible to all young people.
Added to this is a particular challenge: the first job. Prior to the methodological change introduced by the new Labor Force Survey in 2026, the HCP estimated, in the first quarter of 2025, that youth unemployment among those aged 15 to 24 stood at 37.7 percent, compared to 13.3 percent for the labor force as a whole.
But the problem is not limited to the unemployment rate. The transition from academic credentials to employment often remains long and uncertain. Career guidance, information on professions, preparation for job interviews, connections with companies, internships, and first work experience remain underdeveloped or are accessible only unevenly.
At the same time, some fields of study produce more graduates than the market can absorb, while some employers struggle to find candidates with specific skills. Universities, therefore, award degrees without always adequately preparing students for entry into the workforce: digital skills, communication, teamwork, problem-solving, autonomy, and other life skills remain integrated too unevenly into curricula.
The problem, therefore, is not merely the lack of employment, but the difficulty in transforming educational investment into a credible first entry into the workforce.
NEETs represent the most concerning phenomenon. Approximately one in three Moroccan youth between the ages of 15 and 29 is not in employment, education, or training. But this category encompasses profoundly different realities: graduates seeking their first job, youth who dropped out of school, young women prevented from entering the labor market, and young people who have become discouraged after several years of inactivity.
The key issue is not merely knowing their numbers, but understanding their trajectories: How long do they remain NEETs? Who manages to break out of this situation? Thanks to what degree, network, public program, geographic mobility, or first work experience? Such diverse situations cannot be effectively addressed with a one-size-fits-all policy.
A Degree Without the Promise
The democratization of access to education is one of the major achievements of recent decades. But it also creates a new expectation: the academic degree implicitly becomes a promise of social mobility. However, this promise is not always fulfilled.

In its 2024 Economic Survey of Morocco, the OECD highlights the coexistence of high unemployment among young graduates, a shortage of certain skills, and an underutilization of available human capital. Some graduates hold jobs that are unrelated to their education or that fall below their level of qualification, while some companies are unable to find the profiles they need. The problem also affects vocational training, which is designed precisely to respond more directly to the demands of businesses. The gap between investment in education, career aspirations, and the actual value of a degree is thus a major source of frustration
Having a job does not mean being able to build a life
A second mistake is to simply pit employment against unemployment. A job may be informal, poorly paid, unstable, and offer few opportunities for advancement. But even in the formal sector, a young person may work and yet remain unable for a long time to afford housing, save money, or build a family life. The problem, therefore, is not merely having a job, but having a job that is sufficiently productive and well-paying to enable a career path.
This is where the quality of employment ties into the issue of autonomy. A young person is not just looking for a salary. They are seeking the means to have their own housing, get around, make purchases, possibly help their parents, get married if they wish, start a family, and achieve social independence. However, this transition to adulthood is delayed for a significant portion of young people.
One can be statistically “employed” and yet remain financially dependent on one’s parents and be unable to envisage an independent life. What appears in the statistics as an employment problem may be experienced by the young person as a delay in reaching adulthood. Migration thus takes on a different meaning. It is no longer merely a means to earn more; it may appear as a faster path to autonomy.
The household matters just as much as the individual
The aspiration to migrate does not arise in a vacuum. Young people belong to a household. Family income, housing, the ability to save, unemployment among other family members, and the cost of food, transportation, and daily expenses partly determine the options available to them. Even when employed, a young person may have to contribute to household expenses or continue to depend on the household due to insufficient income.
The country’s economic transformation is real, but its benefits are not transmitted with the same speed or intensity in terms of quality jobs, autonomy, and social mobility for all categories of young people.
The HCP surveys on the economic situation and standard of living of households, the World Bank’s studies on poverty, inflation, and vulnerability, as well as the Arab Barometer surveys, make it possible to link objective conditions and perceptions. However, one distinction is essential: it is not only the current inflation rate that matters, but the cumulative effect of rising prices on purchasing power and real household income. These pressures, of course, do not automatically lead to migration. However, they can increase its appeal when combined with insufficient employment, slow career mobility, and delayed independence.
Where you are born still matters
Moroccan youth do not constitute a homogeneous population. Opportunities vary depending on whether one lives in a rural or urban setting, the region, gender, educational level, family income, proximity to major economic hubs, and access to training, digital technology, and transportation. There is thus a genuine geography of opportunity. For some young people, the first migration necessary to access education or employment is already an internal migration to Casablanca, Rabat, Tangier, or another major city.
Added to these disparities is climate-related pressure. Drought, water scarcity, and the increasing vulnerability of certain agricultural activities can further reduce the economic prospects of regions that are already vulnerable. But we must avoid any form of determinism. Drought and territorial disparities do not automatically lead to a desire to migrate. Their effect depends on educational level, household income, the family’s employment situation, migration networks, and opportunities for internal mobility.
We must also take into account the local existence of migration infrastructure: family networks abroad, former migrants, smugglers, information on routes, and proximity to exit routes. Two young people with similar economic characteristics may thus exhibit very different migratory behaviors depending on the networks and the region in which they live. This requires distinguishing between three elements: the aspiration to migrate, the capacity to migrate, and taking action.
The central mechanism: the gap between aspirations and opportunities
All of the above factors identify constraints. But they do not explain why two young people facing similar difficulties might make different decisions. This is where the central mechanism of the analysis comes into play: the gap between aspirations and the perceived possibilities of realizing them—the aspiration-opportunity gap. The relationship between development and migration is not linear.
Development raises educational levels, increases incomes, disseminates information, builds international networks, and broadens horizons. Therefore, it increases both aspirations and, for some, the ability to migrate. To want to leave, one must be able to imagine a different place. To be able to leave, one generally needs a minimum of resources, information, connections, or skills.
That is why the poorest are not necessarily the most mobile. Extreme poverty can, on the contrary, prevent migration due to a lack of means. This observation is particularly important in Morocco.
Poverty reduction has enabled many households to improve their situation without necessarily bringing them into an economically secure middle class. Between poverty and a consolidated middle class lies a broad zone of vulnerability: households that have improved their living conditions but remain exposed to unemployment, inflation, or unexpected expenses. However, escaping poverty also transforms expectations.
A family that has invested in its children’s education no longer expects them merely to earn a minimum income. It expects them to have a job commensurate with their qualifications, career advancement, a home, the ability to save, and a higher social status. Development thus creates new capabilities, but also new aspirations. When the latter grow faster than the former, relative frustration increases.
Moreover, comparisons are no longer made solely with neighbors or the previous generation. It is made with friends living in Europe, members of the diaspora, and the success stories visible daily on social media. Deprivation thus becomes relative: it is no longer simply “I don’t have,” but “I cannot achieve what I aspire to.” This is where one question sums up much of the problem: Do I believe I can build here, through ordinary means, the life to which I aspire?
Afrobarometer offers a particularly revealing finding in this regard. A majority of young people may view Morocco’s general direction favorably while still considering migration. In other words: a young person may believe that Morocco is making progress without feeling that he himself is making enough progress. Migration may then appear not as a rejection of the country, but as another path to social mobility.
From Aspiration to Taking Action: Ceuta as a revelator
This distinction finally allows us to return to Ceuta. The crisis of July 30, 2026, likely did not create the aspiration to emigrate. Surveys conducted long before that date show that this aspiration already existed on a large scale. However, an exceptional event can transform a latent aspiration into a perceived possibility for action.
A young person may have wanted to leave for years without ever attempting to do so. But a piece of information—whether accurate, distorted, or false—that suggests a pathway has opened up, that others have managed to cross, or that the risk of interception has decreased can abruptly change their calculation.
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Social and interpersonal networks can then accelerate the spread of this perception and produce a powerful ripple effect. Therefore, we must distinguish between the causes that explain why a young person wants to leave and those that explain why they decide to do so on that particular day, via that specific route, and alongside thousands of other people.
A study of the people who attempted to cross into Ceuta would be, in this regard, extremely instructive: educational level, previous employment, family income, region of origin, networks abroad, sources of information, and migration history would make it possible to test many of the hypotheses put forward here.
A Challenge of Transmission
The Moroccan paradox is, ultimately, only apparent. The country’s economic transformation is real, but its benefits are not transmitted with the same speed or intensity in terms of quality jobs, autonomy, and social mobility for all categories of young people.
At the same time, this transformation raises their educational level, their access to information, their expectations, and their ability to compare their own path with other possibilities. The challenge is not simply to generate more growth. It is to better channel that growth into credible individual opportunities: a first job, career advancement, housing, geographic and social mobility, and autonomy.
The desire to migrate is not necessarily a sign of a stagnant society or failed development. It can also be the result of a society that is advancing rapidly, where aspirations are progressing even faster than individuals’ ability to realize them.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Maghrebi.org. Lahcen Haddad is a Moroccan politician, currently Vice-President of the House of Councillors and and member of the Pan-African Parliament.
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