The Boulos gamble after the UN’s Libya failure

Libya’s political divide could be entering a new phase as a US-backed initiative seeks to bring the country’s rival administrations under a single executive, but the process has exposed the deep shortcomings of the UN-led efforts that preceded it, as reported by the Libya Gazette on August 24.

In a report published on August 20, the International Crisis Group said the initiative led by US envoy Massad Boulos can achieve something that years of UN-sponsored mediation have failed to deliver, by putting the reunification of Libya’s divided institutions back at the centre of negotiations.

The proposal would merge the rival governments in Tripoli and the east, with Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah reportedly remaining in his post and Saddam Haftar, son of eastern commander Khalifa Haftar, becoming head of the Presidential Council.

Other details remain unresolved, including the location of the new government and how military authority would be divided between the rival forces.

For all its shortcomings, the Boulos initiative has succeeded in moving the political question forward after years of stalled UN efforts. Libya has remained divided between competing governments and military structures since the 2020 ceasefire, while repeated UN-led attempts to establish a unified political framework and hold elections have failed to produce a lasting settlement.

Yet the US has pursued its initiative largely outside that process. The UN was not consulted by US mediators and has instead received only occasional updates. While the proposal supports the UN’s long-standing objective of reunifying Libya, Washington has effectively bypassed the political process established by the organisation to achieve this aim.

That sidelining is particularly significant because the proposed agreement is simply a  political settlement between existing power centres rather than resolve Libya’s leadership crisis through elections. After years of international commitments to allow Libyans to choose their leaders at the ballot box, the initiative risks institutionalising the current balance of power.

The contrast with the UN-led process is difficult to ignore. UNSMIL’s political roadmap places presidential and legislative elections, the formation of a unified government and broader political dialogue at the centre of Libya’s transition, alongside economic, security and reconciliation measures.

Yet years of UN-sponsored negotiations have failed to overcome the political and institutional divisions that have kept Libya split between rival administrations. The Boulos initiative, despite its secrecy and controversial proposals, has taken a more direct approach by putting the merger of those rival power centres at the heart of negotiations. In doing so, it has exposed one of the central weaknesses of the UN process, which is that the UNSMIL roadmap, built around elections and dialogue, has repeatedly struggled to translate its years of structured dialogues into a unified political authority.

The UN’s own February assessment acknowledged that Libya’s rival institutions remained unable to agree on key steps needed for elections, with unilateral actions further eroding confidence in the process.

The reported elevation of Saddam Haftar is the most controversial element of the Boulos initiative. His forces played a central role in the 2019-2020 assault on Tripoli, and several powerful armed groups in western Libya remain hostile to the Haftar camp. His appointment could provoke armed resistance and undermine the relative calm Libya has maintained since the 2020 ceasefire.

The possibility of Saddam Haftar taking control of Libya’s Presidential Council has become one of the main sources of opposition to the proposed US-backed settlement. The concern is not simply over his appointment, but over what could follow if he gains control of the country’s highest political institution.

The arrangement could allow Haftar to gradually concentrate power and push Abdulhamid Dbeibah aside, rather than creating a durable partnership between the two camps. Several figures within the Haftar camp have reportedly already suggested that Dbeibah could eventually be removed if the agreement is implemented.

The position could also provide Haftar with considerable powers under the 2015 Skhirat agreement. As president, he could declare a state of emergency, mobilise security forces and introduce exceptional measures, raising concerns about how easily the new political structure could be turned into a vehicle for concentrating authority.

That prospect has heightened fears of a military reaction in western Libya. Influential armed groups have reportedly indicated that they would consider using force to prevent Haftar from taking the position.

The initiative has also faced criticism for being negotiated largely behind closed doors. Many Libyans fear that an agreement reached without broader political and public participation could entrench existing power structures, encourage authoritarianism and leave widespread corruption untouched.

Reunifying Libya’s institutions could provide a way out of the country’s prolonged political impasse. But it warns that Washington should not rush to secure an agreement before its details are settled and broader support is secured.

The US and UN are now pursuing parallel tracks towards broadly similar goals, but through polar opposite different methods. UNSMIL continues to prioritise an electoral roadmap, while Washington has focused on reaching an agreement between the country’s existing power centres in Tripoli and Benghazi.

The US initiative may offer the most significant attempt in years to address the country’s institutional division, but it has done so while pushing aside the UN process that was supposed to deliver that very outcome. The success of the Boulos initiative may therefore depend not only on whether Washington can bring Libya’s rival camps together, but on whether it can avoid repeating the failures of the international efforts that came before it.

The success of the Boulos initiative may therefore depend not only on whether Washington can bring Libya’s rival camps together, but on whether it can avoid repeating the failures of the international efforts without leading to an authoritarian military dynasty.

International Crisis Group, UN, UNSMIL, Libya Gazette, Maghrebi.org