Adalberto Agozino: Ethiopian crisis pushes region on brink of war
The truce that in November 2022 brought an end to one of the deadliest wars of the 21st century has been shattered. In the early morning hours of September 23, 2026, Tigrayan forces seized the airports in Mekele, Axum, and Shire, suspended Ethiopian Airlines flights to the north, and opened fronts in Afar and Amhara. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) called it “a defensive war.” Addis Ababa called it “a full-scale offensive.” What both sides agree on is that the map of alliances has been turned upside down: militias that were killing each other four years ago are now fighting together against Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.
On September 20, seven groups announced on Tigray TV the formation of the Alliance of Ethiopian People’s Forcesfor Survival. The statement was read by Zemene Kassie, president of the Amhara National Movement Fano, who was appointed president of the coalition. The stated goal is to overthrow the Prosperity Party, establish a transitional government, and initiate a constitutional dialogue. There is no unified command or joint general staff. There is, however, a common adversary.
The Two Sides
On one side is the federal government: Abiy Ahmed, the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) under Field Marshal Birhanu Jula, the federal police, and local allies. Operating in Tigray is the rival TPLF faction, organized under the Peace and Change Council and the so-called Tigray Peace Forces, linked to Getachew Reda, a former negotiator in Pretoria who was expelled from the party and is now an advisor to the prime minister. The Afar regional government and federal units have attempted to contain the advance toward Abala, Erebti, and the Semera corridor. On September 27 and 28, Addis Ababa announced the recapture of Sekota and Alamata. The government’s most feared weapon remains its air superiority: drones and strikes against targets in Mekele, including the Tigray TV headquarters.
The Ethiopian paradox is an old one: an indispensable yet fragile state, an ethnic federalism that shapes politics and multiplies militias, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate who has waged two wars in less than a decade.
On the other side stands the alliance of seven. The TPLF provides the bulk of the military force—the Tigray Defense Forces—and territorial control of the region. It is led by Debretsion Gebremichael, who was reinstated in May 2026 as regional president by the council elected in 2020, in defiance of the federal interim administration. Vice President Amanuel Assefa summed up the doctrine: “We are at total war”. Spokesperson Michael Asgedom stated that Pretoria “is no longer valid”.
The Amhara Fano, a coalition of nationalist militias that fought alongside Abiy against Tigray in 2020–2022 and has since 2023 risen up against the disarmament of regional forces, provides the second component. Its ideology combines the defense of Amhara identity, rejection of recentralization, and claims to territories in western Tigray.
The Oromo Liberation Army (OLA or OLF-Shane), led militarily by Jaal Marroo, has been waging an insurgency in Oromia since 2018, with demands for Oromo self-determination and a history of abuses documented by the United Nations.
Rounding out the alliance are the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), whose overseas faction led by Abdirahman Mohamed Sheikh Mahdi has joined the alliance, while leaders in Jijiga deny this; the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (Ugugumo or ANURF), led by Ibrahim Osman Aliyu, “Haji Ibrahim”, a figure from Berhale related to Defense Minister Aisha Mohammed; the Benishangul People’s Liberation Movement; and the Gumuz People’s Democratic Movement. Their common ground is negative: opposition to Abiy. Territorial disputes between Tigrayans and Amharas have not disappeared.
The TPLF: From Hegemon to Insurgent
No other actor embodies as much history as the TPLF. Founded as a guerrilla movement against the Derg, it dominated Ethiopia between 1991 and 2018 through the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front. Under Meles Zenawi, it shaped ethnic federalism and an authoritarian developmentalist state. It represents a region of some six million people in a country of over 120 million. That disproportion between accumulated power and its demographic base partly explains its downfall.
Abiy, an Oromo, dissolved the coalition, created the Prosperity Party, and ousted the Tigrayan elite. The 2020 regional elections in Tigray—held in defiance of the federal extension of the term—accelerated the conflict. In November 2020, Addis Ababa accused the TPLF of attacking a military barracks in Mekele. Two years of war followed, along with Eritrean intervention, a humanitarian blockade, and, according to estimates cited by The Guardian and the African Union, nearly 600,000 deaths. Pretoria imposed a ceasefire, gradual disarmament, and the restoration of federal authority, but excluded Eritrea and the Amhara militias. Western Tigray remained occupied. Disarmament remained incomplete.

In 2024–2025, the TPLF split. Getachew Reda supported the process; Debretsion denounced it as a breach of agreement. In May 2026, Debretsion regained control of regional institutions. Federal drones, forced conscription, and skirmishes in Tselemt and along the Sudanese border preceded the September offensive. Kjetil Tronvoll of Oslo New University College interprets the advance in Afar as a repeat of the 2021 strategy: cutting off fuel and imports coming from Djibouti. Mehari Taddele Maru described it as “a declaration of all-out war”. Jalale Getachew Birru of ACLED warns that the federal government’s calculations would change if the Semera-Djibouti route were threatened.
External Support and the Risk of Regional War
Ethiopia accuses Eritrea of financing and coordinating the alliance. Asmara denies this. The investment is historic: Isaias Afwerki fought the TPLF for decades and sent troops against it in 2020–2022. He was excluded from Pretoria. Then Abiy claimed access to the Red Sea—Ethiopia has been a landlocked country since 1993—and signed a memorandum with Somaliland. For Eritrea, a strengthened Abiy poses an existential threat to Assab and Massawa. Analysts from the International Crisis Group and Al Jazeera describe tactical contacts between Asmara and Debretsion’s faction, not a publicly announced formal alliance.
On September 27, Birhanu Jula also accused Egypt and Sudan of supporting the rebels. Khartoum rejected the accusation. The context is complex: the Renaissance Dam (GERD), set to open in 2025 without a binding operational agreement with Cairo and Khartoum; the Sudanese war between the army of Abdel Fattah al-Burhan—who is close to Eritrea and Egypt—and Hemedti’s RSF, to which Addis Ababa and, according to UN experts, the United Arab Emirates are said to have provided support; and Tigrayan fighters who have taken refuge in territory controlled by the Sudanese army. The UAE has condemned the TPLF’s offensive and reaffirmed its support for the federal government.
Why Ethiopia Matters
Ethiopia is the second most populous country in Africa, home to the African Union, a major power along the Blue Nile, and a pivotal nation in the Horn of Africa. Its stability affects Djibouti—through which nearly all of its trade passes—the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Somalia, South Sudan, and Kenya. A nationwide war would merge the insurgencies already underway in Amhara and Oromia with the northern front and could become internationalized if Eritrea intervenes or if the Djibouti corridor is closed. Laetitia Bader of Human Rights Watch has highlighted the risk to civilians at a time when diplomatic attention is absorbed by Sudan, “the world’s largest humanitarian crisis.”
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The United States is watching with strategic concern and little patience. Washington has mediated in previous crises, imposed sanctions on actors in the previous war, and needs a navigable Horn of Africa for Red Sea security and its rivalry with China. It is unlikely to send troops; it will, however, press—along with the AU, the EU, and IGAD—for de-escalation and a return to Pretoria. China, the leading trading partner and investor in infrastructure and the GERD project, prioritizes the stability of the central government and the protection of its assets. Beijing generally avoids taking sides between ethnic factions and, in practice, favors Addis Ababa as the sovereign interlocutor.
Neighboring countries do not have the luxury of distance. Djibouti fears losing its port revenue. Kenya and IGAD fear waves of refugees. Somalia is watching for any secessionist precedent. Egypt measures every cubic meter of the Nile. Eritrea is calculating whether a weakened and dependent TPLF is a better bulwark than a naval Abiy. Sudan is already a foreign battlefield.
The Ethiopian paradox is an old one: an indispensable yet fragile state, an ethnic federalism that shapes politics and multiplies militias, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate who has waged two wars in less than a decade. The alliance of the seven does not resolve the contradictions between Tigrayans and Amharas, Oromos and Ogadenis. It merely postpones them. If the Djibouti corridor holds and drone superiority prevails, Abiy can contain the offensive as a “manageable challenge”, in Birru’s words. If the fronts merge and Asmara or Khartoum cease to be bystanders, the Horn of Africa will go from having two parallel wars to a single, larger one.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Maghrebi.org. Adalberto Agozino is a political analyst and Professor of Political Science at the University of Buenos Aires, Argentina. This article was originally published in Atalayar.
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