Hamoud Ghaillani: New phase of negotiations for the Western Sahara conflict

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Hamoud Ghaillani: New phase of negotiations for the Western Sahara conflict

In the corridors of the United Nations, the approach of October 31 is bringing Western Sahara back to the center of diplomatic negotiations. Officially, the Security Council is set to decide on the future of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). In reality, the discussions center on a more fundamental question: how to transform the new political framework defined in 2025 into an effective settlement process?

Resolution 2797, adopted on October 31, 2025, shifted the parameters of the negotiations by giving a central role to Morocco’s proposal for autonomy. However, it did not eliminate the requirement for a mutually acceptable political solution that would allow for the self-determination of the Sahrawi people.

Rabat sees this as a consolidation of international support for its initiative. The Polisario Front continues to defend the principle of self-determination, while facing a shifting balance of power. Algiers remains committed to a negotiated solution under the auspices of the United Nations.

For Washington, the stakes are different. It is no longer simply a matter of resuming talks, but of producing a political outcome solid enough to justify U.S. involvement.

The U.S. Challenge: Reaching a Compromise Without Derailing the Negotiations

Discussions held in Madrid and Washington throughout 2026 confirmed the growing role of the United States in diplomatic initiatives. Led by Mike Waltz and Massad Boulos, Washington seeks to maintain political momentum, in coordination with the personal envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General, Staffan de Mistura.

The U.S. approach is distinguished by its pragmatism. Whereas the United Nations traditionally prioritizes maintaining a consensus-based framework, Washington appears more interested in defining a negotiable solution and the means to ensure its implementation.

A representation that includes the Polisario, the MSP, and other Sahrawi voices could strengthen the legitimacy of an agreement, provided it does not cause further polarization.

But the key players do not necessarily interpret their participation in the same way. For Morocco, the negotiations must specify the terms of autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. For the Polisario Front, agreeing to discuss the issue does not necessarily mean renouncing its historical claims.

Washington must solve a delicate equation: keeping the Polisario Front at the table, preserving Algerian involvement, securing specific commitments from Morocco, and avoiding another process with no deadline.

Ricardo Fabiani and the Dilemma of Sahrawi Representation

The analyses by Ricardo Fabiani, project director for North Africa at the International Crisis Group, provide useful insight. The researcher highlights the limitations of the negotiations and the difficulties in reaching a compromise. He warns that bypassing the Polisario could undermine the legitimacy of an agreement and provoke a negative reaction from Algiers.

The Polisario Front remains a recognized interlocutor in the UN process. Its historical role, its presence in the Tindouf camps, and its capacity for mobilization give it political weight that no credible settlement can ignore.

But does the need to keep the Polisario Front at the negotiating table mean that all other forms of Sahrawi political expression must be permanently excluded?

In his recent remarks, Fabiani favors a gradual opening, based on the creation of precedents that could be expanded, rather than an abrupt transformation of the diplomatic format. A representation that includes the Polisario, the MSP, and other Sahrawi voices could strengthen the legitimacy of an agreement, provided it does not cause further polarization.

For the MSP, the ability to block negotiations cannot, in and of itself, constitute a permanent claim to representation for an entire population.

The MSP: A Third Way Facing a Test of Its Credibility

Founded in 2020 and led by Hach Ahmed Baricalla, the Sahrawi Movement for Peace is attempting to develop a political platform distinct from that of the Polisario. Its doctrine is based on the recognition of Sahrawi political diversity, the acceptance of a negotiated territorial compromise, and a priority placed on reconciliation and the voluntary return of refugees.

The movement considers that autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty, accompanied by robust institutional and international guarantees, represents the most viable solution. This position does not constitute an established consensus within Sahrawi society.

The MSP’s proposals focus in particular on representative autonomous institutions, a transition spanning several years, local security, the reintegration of those affected by the conflict, and reconstruction efforts for refugees.

To become a sustainable negotiating partner, the MSP will need to demonstrate its ability to engage in dialogue with the populations in the camps, residents of Sahrawi cities, and diaspora communities, whose expectations are not uniform.

Game-Changing U.S. Contacts

The June 30, 2026, meeting between Mike Waltz and an MSP delegation represents a significant diplomatic achievement for the movement. While it does not constitute official admission to the negotiations conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, it signals a U.S. willingness to engage with other Sahrawi actors.

The fact that the U.S. continues to maintain parallel contacts with the Polisario Front shows that Washington has not chosen to replace one interlocutor with another. A strategy of cautious expansion would allow for testing proposals on institutional guarantees, governance, and the return of refugees, without imposing an immediate change to the diplomatic format.

If this openness were perceived as an attempt to marginalize the Polisario Front, however, it could actually strengthen resistance.

The Guterres Report and Sahrawi Consent

Reports in the Spanish press in October 2026 bring the consultation of the Sahrawi people back to the center of the debate. The choice of a negotiating framework does not preclude seeking the consent of those who will live under the new institutions.

The MSP could advocate a three-step approach: negotiating a detailed institutional framework, defining a credible consultation mechanism, and adopting international safeguards to secure the agreement.

Sahrawi republic
The Sahrawi Republic Prime Minister, Bouchraya Hamoudi Bayoun, attends an African Union Summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, February 2026.

Proposals regarding a transitional council and a framework agreement indicate that discussions could now focus on the architecture of a settlement, moving beyond mere positions of principle.

MINURSO: Between Continuation and Transformation

MINURSO, deployed since 1991, faces an institutional contradiction. Its historical mandate remains tied to the referendum, while negotiations are primarily moving toward a compromise based on autonomy.

Three options are emerging: maintaining the mission in its current configuration, gradually reducing its resources, or transforming some of its functions to support a potential agreement.

An international mission could, subject to a new mandate, help verify security commitments and support the institutional transition. However, transforming MINURSO before a sufficiently accepted agreement is in place would pose considerable risks.

Four Scenarios for After October 2026

First scenario: an adjusted status quo. The Security Council renews MINURSO and confirms the current framework, without substantial political progress.

Second scenario: a framework agreement spearheaded by the United States. The parties begin detailed negotiations on autonomous powers, the transition, security, guarantees, and consultation procedures.

Third scenario: a gradual opening to Sahrawi pluralism. Official negotiations continue, while the MSP and other factions participate in supplementary consultations on guarantees, refugees, and governance.

Fourth scenario: a breakdown and escalation. Excessive pressure causes a key actor to withdraw or stall, exacerbating regional tensions.

These scenarios are not definitive predictions. The third scenario could usefully complement the second: the gradual expansion of consultations would then consolidate a negotiated framework agreement rather than compete with the official process.

The Real Test: Guarantees and the Return of Refugees

For the populations in the Tindouf camps, the residents of Sahrawi cities, and the communities settled in Mauritania, Spain, or elsewhere, peace cannot be reduced to a new legal formulation. It should guarantee freedom of movement, security, family reunification, access to housing, and economic prospects.

The voluntary return of refugees requires security guarantees, the protection of rights, mechanisms for resolving land disputes, and the freedom to maintain one’s political convictions.

After fifty years of conflict, the question is who is ready to make the necessary commitments to end exile, reunite families, and allow a new generation of Sahrawis to build their future.

A transition period of twenty-four to thirty-six months could be considered, subject to an agreement between the parties. The United States, the European Union, and regional partners could contribute to a fund for housing, infrastructure, employment, and economic reintegration.

Mauritania would play a role in trade and people-to-people relations. Algeria would remain indispensable to any solution involving the Tindouf camps. Credible autonomy should also clearly define the transferred powers and the oversight mechanisms.

The Trump Factor: A Limited Diplomatic Window

The U.S. recognition of Moroccan sovereignty, announced in December 2020, shifted the diplomatic balance. The renewed engagement observed in 2026 gave new momentum to the negotiations.

But the attention of major powers can fluctuate. The challenge lies in transforming a diplomatic window dependent on Washington into an international mechanism capable of surviving political changes.

READ: Raphael Machado: 3 years on from 7th October, a changed Middle East?

For the MSP, this situation opens up the possibility of presenting the compromise as an instrument of reconciliation rather than as a victory for one side.

The MSP Faces a Political Opportunity to Seize

The MSP’s emergence in diplomatic discussions does not mean it has become an actor on par with Morocco or the Polisario Front. It does, however, reveal that Sahrawi political representation is beginning to be viewed from a more pluralistic perspective.

The movement would benefit from prioritizing a gradual integration process: consultations, working groups, dialogue with civil society actors, and proposals on guarantees and the transition.

The real question is not which organization should emerge victorious from a rivalry over representation, but how to build a settlement to which the various components of Sahrawi society can freely contribute.

A new resolution will not be enough

Morocco benefits from a favorable diplomatic environment. The Polisario retains its capacity for political resistance. Algeria remains a key player. Washington wields decisive influence, though it cannot single-handedly impose a lasting peace.

The upcoming Security Council vote will be an important indicator, but not an end in itself. The real turning point will come when the parties agree to negotiate not only the status of the territory, but also the institutions, guarantees, and the human conditions of peace.

After fifty years of conflict, the question is who is ready to make the necessary commitments to end exile, reunite families, and allow a new generation of Sahrawis to build their future.

A compromise will only be sustainable if it ceases to be perceived as a defeat for some and instead becomes a guarantee of a future for all.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Maghrebi.org. Hamoud Ghaillani is a political analyst based in Mauritania, specialist of the Western Sahara conflict. This article was originally published in Atalayar.

If you wish to pitch an opinion piece, please send your article to opinion@maghrebi.org. 

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