The death of a Moroccan-born man during a police arrest in the northern Italian city of Bologna has sparked protests leading to intensified scrutiny of police conduct on 21 July. The incident has reignited debate over race, accountability and the treatment of minority communities in Italy, according to Sky News and the BBC, with many analysts comparing it to the Black Lives Matter movement that dominated the US in 2020.

Demonstrators gathered across Bologna after 42-year-old Abderrahim Fakir died during an attempted arrest on 20 July. Videos circulating on social media appear to show him restrained on the ground by police officers while repeatedly calling for help before becoming unresponsive. Prosecutors have since opened an investigation, with authorities confirming that officers’ body-camera footage will form part of the inquiry.

The protests quickly escalated into clashes between demonstrators and police, with officers deploying tear gas and water cannons after some protesters threw bottles, fireworks and other objects. While Italian authorities condemned the violence, opposition politicians and civil rights organisations argued that the unrest reflected deeper public concerns over policing and institutional accountability rather than the arrest alone.

The incident has also become politically significant because it extends beyond questions surrounding a single death. It has revived longstanding concerns over the use of force by law enforcement, particularly involving migrants and ethnic minorities, at a time when immigration remains one of Italy’s most contested political issues. Human rights groups have called for a transparent investigation, arguing that public confidence will depend on whether accountability is pursued independently of political pressure.

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has called for a full investigation, calling the events ‘unacceptable’, while urging restraint from all sides, insisting that responsibility should be established through judicial processes rather than public confrontation. Government officials have also defended the principle of the presumption of innocence for police officers, warning against drawing conclusions before the investigation is completed.

The case nevertheless exposes wider tensions within Italian society. Immigration has become increasingly central to the national political debate, with successive governments strengthening border controls and expanding police powers in response to public concerns over security. Critics argue that this environment has contributed to greater distrust between law enforcement and minority communities, while supporters maintain that stronger policing is necessary to preserve public order.

For Morocco, the incident has acquired diplomatic significance. Rabat has requested a thorough investigation into the circumstances surrounding Fakir’s death, reflecting the sensitivity of cases involving Moroccan nationals abroad and the importance both governments place on maintaining bilateral relations.

The Bologna case continues to illustrate the broader challenge confronting many European democracies. Maintaining effective policing requires public trust as much as operational authority.

Ultimately, the significance of the Bologna protests extends beyond the immediate investigation into Abderrahim Fakir’s death. Their long-term impact will depend not only on establishing the circumstances surrounding the arrest, but also on whether the case prompts wider reforms aimed at strengthening transparency, accountability and public confidence in policing within an increasingly diverse Italian society.

Sky News, BBC News, Maghrebi.org

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The US-backed deal aimed at breaking Libya free from it’s political paralysis is raising fresh questions over whether it can deliver genuine change in a country plagued by endemic corruption.

In a report published on July 20^th, Chatham House has warned that efforts to end Libya’s political division, through a power-sharing agreement between rival elites, could fail to improve governance, while potentially deepening the corruption and financial mismanagement that continues to burden the country.

The warning comes as US efforts to resolve Libya’s political deadlock intensify, with Massad Boulos, US President Donald Trump’s senior adviser on Arab and African affairs, seeking to bring together the two main rival political camps. Libya remains divided between the UN-recognised Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli, controlled by the Dbeibah family, and the Benghazi-based Government of National Stability (GNS), aligned with Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF).

Boulos’ proposal would seek to unite the Haftars and Dbeibah’s alongside other key constituencies under a single government. In June, LAAF deputy commander Saddam Haftar travelled to Washington for talks with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, as Boulos sought the Haftar family’s backing for a power-sharing arrangement. The Dbeibah family did not travel to Washington, although Boulos continues to seek its support.

Opponents of the proposal fear it could reinforce family rule and legitimise the two rival families, while doing little to address the concerns of ordinary Libyans. The focus on dividing political power among elites risks overlooking the state’s ability to provide essential services and also sidelines the pathway to national elections.

Two recent reports produced by a coalition involving Libya’s Audit Bureau and National Anti-Corruption Commission highlight the scale of the challenges facing the country. Examining subsidised fuel and medicine supply chains, the reports describe systems marked by weak oversight, conflicts of interest and significant financial losses.

The fuel report found that Libya’s fuel import bill exceeded $9 billion in 2024, equivalent to almost $1,200 per person. Imports had more than doubled since 2021, while fuel consumption by state-affiliated armed groups and the Tripoli South Power Plant rose sharply. The report suggested that vested interests may be controlling lucrative supply chains, with subsidised public goods potentially diverted to black markets or smuggled abroad.

Similar concerns were identified in the medicine sector, where the absence of a national supply framework and a flawed system for registering pharmaceutical companies have allowed a small number of firms to expand rapidly. Some were found to have direct links to state officials and parliamentarians involved in shaping procurement policies.

The US-mediated unified budget for Libya, agreed in April, has yet to be meaningfully implemented, highlighting how political agreements negotiated abroad, without a clear implementation plan, have done little to change economic realities on the ground.

Chatham House argues that these findings raise questions over whether political power-sharing alone can provide the foundations for economic development. Without stronger financial transparency, public-service priorities and clear mechanisms to ensure implementation, a unified government could simply formalise existing arrangements without changing conditions on the ground.

As criticism of the US-backed plan mounts within Libya, a notable omission from the Chatham House report is the fact that there is an absence of a clear timeline for national elections in the US-backed power-sharing proposal, raising questions over how long an interim political arrangement could remain in place. Without a defined path towards elections, the deal risks focusing on the redistribution of power among Libya’s rival elites rather than establishing a clear route towards a democratically legitimate, unified government.

The US-backed power-sharing proposal has also faced scepticism over whether it can overcome the entrenched divisions between Libya’s rival political camps. Speaking to the Financial Times, Claudia Gazzini, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, described hopes of reconciliation as “wishful thinking”, arguing that there is little public discussion in Benghazi about reaching an accommodation with Tripoli.

Instead, she said, “There’s no public narrative here in Benghazi about reconciling with the other side or that it’s time to move on. It is all about the achievements of the people now in power and it’s all based on identifying Tripoli as the enemy.”

Ultimately, the success of the US-backed plan will depend on whether it delivers genuine institutional reform rather than simply rearranging, and consolidating, Libya’s existing centres of power. Without firm safeguards against corruption, greater accountability and a credible path towards elections, the agreement risks entrenching the very authoritarian and patronage-based systems that have kept Libya divided, allowing rival elites to consolidate their influence under the guise of national unity.

Chatham House, Libya Audit Bureau, Financial Times, Maghrebi.org

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Algerian authorities have been investigating the sources behind multiple wildfires. According to TSA Algerie, this announcement by the Minister of the Interior, Said Sayoud, takes place after a deadly fire on the 21st of July, causing the death of six people. 

In Seraidi near the city of Annaba, a “true catastrophe has been avoided”, declared Sayoud. Since the beginning of the summer, Algeria has been facing unseen wildfires, with a rapid rate of spread and increasingly dangerous conditions. The North East of the country has been particularly affected as many forests are situated in this area of the territory, close to the Tunisian border. Wildfires have gotten closer to houses and civilian infrastructure, leading to the evacuation of hospitals and houses. 

The Minister of the Interior has travelled to Annaba and its surroundings to pay visits to people impacted by the fires. 

Firefighters have been fighting the wildfires, which are widely caused by an intense heatwave hitting North Africa, as well as strong winds facilitating propagation. In certain cities of Algeria such as Bejaia, temperatures have reached 55° C. 

“We have recorded 160 fires since the end of last weekend in the northern provinces. Investigations by the security services are ongoing to determine whether these fires were caused by criminal acts or natural factors,” said Saïd Sayoud.

On the 21st of July, Algerian authorities recorded 170 wildfires in 19 regions. Firefighters have managed to extinguish 104, while 66 are still going. Since the 8th of July, 1555 wildfires have been recorded. 

The heatwave has also brought complications to the electric installations of 16 regions, which were left completely in the dark on the 14th of July due to a technical fault in an electric installation in Biskra. Electricity came back on a few hours later, but persistent electricity outages remain a major issue for the Algerian authorities, particularly in extreme weather conditions. 

TSA, Maghrebi.org

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In an interview given to the Algerian media outlet TSA on the 15th of July, the French Ambassador to Algeria Stephane Romatet announced his intention to come back to the original number of visas delivered to Algerian nationals, approximately 250,000 per year.

The last two years have been marked by significant diplomatic and economic clashes between Algeria and France, leading to a decline in visa issuance. However, recent diplomatic rapprochement has created favourable conditions for bilateral agreements and improved relations. 

“It is true that, over the past few months, we have faced some difficulties. There were fewer staff members handling visa applications, and it also became much harder for Algerians to secure an appointment,” said Stephane Romatet, before further adding that “Before the crisis, around 250,000 visas were issued each year…It is true that, because of the difficulties I have just mentioned, that number declined. Our objective is to ensure that the number of visas we issue to Algerian citizens who have legitimate reasons to travel to France starts increasing again and eventually returns to its pre-crisis level.”

These statements given to the Algerian media sparked controversy in French right and far-right parties. Leader of the far-right party Rassemblement National, Marine Le Pen, reacted by saying that “The complete opening of the migration floodgates by an exhausted Macronist government is not an option for France.” Other right-wing figures, such as Bruno Retailleau, added that this represented a ‘capitulation’ by France to Algiers.

Emmanuel Macron reacted to the controversy on the 22nd of July by stating at a cabinet meeting that “There is no set target for the number of visas issued, and France is not being lax in its approach.”

The French government Spokesperson Maud Bregeon further added that “From the moment he was elected in 2017, Mr Macron made the decision to reduce these figures so that they would better reflect France’s needs on the one hand, and geopolitical realities on the other,” recalling that around 500,000 visas were being issued each year at the time.

Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez, who hosted his counterpart in Paris last June, added during the Council of Ministers’ press briefing, “I took part in discussions with Algeria. This issue was never raised.”

Le Monde, TSA, Le Figaro, Maghrebi.org

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On June 26, 2026, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Burkina Faso notified the French Embassy in Ouagadougou of a seven-day deadline for the closure of its diplomatic mission, transitional President Ibrahim Traoré received, at Koulouba, as part of a collective accreditation ceremony for eight new ambassadors, the letters of credence from Simon-Clément Seroussi, Israel’s representative to the Ivory Coast and also accredited to Togo, Benin, and Burkina Faso. The timing of the formal break with the former colonial power and the opening of a structured diplomatic channel with the State of Israel is no coincidence: it encapsulates, in a single symbolic act, the redefinition of international alliances currently underway within the Alliance of Sahelian States (AES) and, more broadly, in Sahelian West Africa. The case of Burkina Faso allows us to observe, on a smaller scale, a broader continental dynamic: Israel’s expansion into areas of sub-Saharan Africa once considered peripheral to the Zionist entity’s strategic interests – amid growing competition with Turkey and Iran – and Ouagadougou’s simultaneous search for partners capable of offering technology, intelligence, and diplomatic leeway outside the Western framework, which is now viewed as hostile.

Let us begin with a general historical overview. Relations between Israel and what was then Upper Volta have their roots in the so-called “golden age” of Israeli diplomacy in Africa – the 1960s – when Israel maintained diplomatic relations with thirty-three African states, practically all of sub-Saharan Africa with the exception of Mauritania and Somalia. At that time, Israel proposed to the continent a model of postcolonial development that was an alternative to both the Soviet bloc and the former European colonial powers: agricultural cooperation through MASHAV programs, infrastructure investments, technical training, and military assistance. Upper Volta was part of this framework, hosting Israeli military delegations engaged in training local forces, following the same model adopted in Ghana, Benin, Zaire, and Tanzania.

The Zionist entity’s African strategy – following the post-1973 collapse and the slow reconstruction initiated by Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman beginning in the late 2000s – has accelerated significantly since 2023, with the opening of new embassies

This phase came to an abrupt end in 1973. In the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, diplomatic and economic pressure exerted by the Arab League – through an oil embargo and the promise of alternative financial support – led nearly all member states of the Organization of African Unity to sever relations with Israel. Upper Volta aligned itself with this continental trend, explicitly declaring, in successive communications to the United Nations, that it maintained no economic, political, or military relations with the Jewish state “in solidarity with the Palestinian and Arab peoples,” and that it regretted the resumption of diplomatic relations by other African countries. This principled stance, typical of the Third World non-alignment movement of the time, remained essentially unchanged even after the country was renamed Burkina Faso in 1984, under the presidency of Thomas Sankara.

The relative thaw that took place in the 1990s – in the context of the Oslo Accords and the normalization process promoted by Shimon Peres, which in 1993 marked the resumption of formal diplomatic relations with Ouagadougou – never translated into a structured Israeli presence on Burkinabé territory. Until very recently, in fact, Burkina Faso remained the only member of the AES to formally recognize Israel while never having hosted an embassy or consulate on its territory: Burkinabé citizens had to turn to the Israeli mission in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, to obtain visas and consular services. It is against this backdrop of dormant relations – never truly materialized by a physical presence – that the turning point of June 2026 occurred: the accreditation of Ambassador Seroussi in Ouagadougou marks the first step toward a truly operational bilateral relationship, based – according to a statement from the Burkinabé presidency – on a general agreement on economic, scientific, technical, and cultural cooperation, accompanied by an institutional framework still in the process of being established.

The political significance of this development must be understood in light of the Traoré government’s shift in stance toward Iran. Until just a few weeks earlier, Ouagadougou had maintained close cooperation with Tehran, culminating in the official visit of the Burkinabé defense minister to the Iranian capital on the very eve of the attacks by the so-called “Epstein Coalition” – an informal term used in the regional press to refer to the Israeli-U.S. military campaign of February 2026 against Iran, which led to the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The subsequent realignment of Burkina Faso’s foreign policy axis – marked by a gradual “split” in its diplomatic approach toward a balance between Tehran and Tel Aviv – attests, according to analysis published in the regional press beginning in April 2026, to the prevalence of pragmatism in security matters over ideological impulses: Israel reportedly offered the Burkinabé junta more tangible benefits than those guaranteed by Iran, particularly confidential intelligence channels and the exchange of operational data on jihadist groups active in the Sahel – a crucial element for a government whose legitimacy is based largely on the promise of territorial reconquest and internal security.

The Confederation of Sahel States and the conflict with the western imperialist axis

To understand the logic behind this opening toward Israel, it is necessary to place it within the institutional and ideological trajectory of the Alliance of Sahel States, established as a mutual defense pact on September 16, 2023, between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso – the so-called Liptako-Gourma Charter – and transformed into a confederation at the Niamey summit on July 6, 2024. The AES represents the most comprehensive attempt in contemporary West Africa to build an alternative security sovereignty architecture to both ECOWAS (from which the three countries formally withdrew on January 29, 2025) and the postcolonial cooperation structures inherited from Françafrique. The progress made in just three years is impressive both symbolically and institutionally: a confederal flag, an official anthem (“Sahel Benkan”), a common biometric passport, a unified customs tariff of 0.5% on imports from outside the confederation, the Confederation’s Investment and Development Bank (BCID-AES) endowed with 500 billion CFA francs, withdrawal from the International Organization of La Francophonie, and, more recently, the launch of efforts to establish a confederal parliament, whose operational framework was discussed in Ouagadougou on June 29, 2026, during the days of the break with Paris.

The AES’s official narrative is based on an explicit rejection of what the military governments define as “security-driven neocolonialism”: the condemnation of the ineffectiveness of the French Operation Barkhane, the challenge to the Western military presence as a destabilizing rather than a stabilizing factor, and the assertion of full sovereignty over the former colonial powers. While this narrative serves to consolidate the juntas’ domestic legitimacy, it also taps into a widespread popular sentiment of frustration with over a decade of French military presence that has failed to stem the expansion of jihadist groups – from Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) to the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara – from central Mali to the northern borders of Benin.

The diplomatic break with France, announced at the end of June 2026 with just seven days’ notice of the closure of the embassy in Ouagadougou, should be interpreted as the formal codification of a rift that had already been consummated in substance. Significant in this regard is the nature of the accusations that the Burkinabé government and the Russian security establishment – its main military ally – are leveling against Paris and its Western allies: the deputy secretary of the Russian Security Council, Aleksandr Venediktov, has publicly stated that France, along with Ukraine and other European countries, is directly supporting terrorist networks operating in the Sahel to destabilize the governments of the Confederation.

At this juncture of an almost total break with the traditional West – a break exacerbated by the European Parliament’s resolution of June 18, 2026, which criticizes the human rights situation in Burkina Faso and was condemned by the parliaments of the AES as an act of interference – the Traoré government finds itself in the position of having to identify third-party interlocutors capable of fulfilling two complementary functions: on the one hand, to provide an indirect channel through which to exert pressure or communicate with actors with whom direct relations are compromised or nonexistent; on the other hand, to offer technological and security expertise that the orientation toward Russia and China – however strategically central – cannot fully compensate for on its own, especially in the sectors of operational intelligence, precision agriculture, and water resource management.

A European Trojan horse or a potential pragmatic partner?

It is in this strategic gap that Israel’s offer fits. The Zionist entity’s African strategy – following the post-1973 collapse and the slow reconstruction initiated by Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman beginning in the late 2000s – has accelerated significantly since 2023, with the opening of new embassies and high-level missions on a continent where Israel currently has just thirteen diplomatic posts, three economic offices, and a single military attaché – a presence still far smaller than that of its “golden age.” This expansion addresses a twofold need: on the one hand, to increase the number of diplomatic allies within international organizations, capable of counterbalancing the automatic majorities hostile to Israel in multilateral forums; on the other, to prevent and monitor the expansion of networks linked to Iran and Hezbollah on the continent, after Israel intensified, beginning in October 2023, its campaign aimed at eroding Iran’s regional influence.

It is precisely the scope of the strategic competition with Tehran and Ankara that provides the most solid framework for understanding the acceleration of Israel’s initiative in the Sahel. While Iran has strengthened its ties with the AES in recent years by supplying drone systems used in regional conflicts and expanding religious and cultural networks linked to Shi’ite universities and BRICS circles, Turkey, for its part, has built a pervasive presence on the continent through various but equally far-reaching means: humanitarian diplomacy, infrastructure investments, the export of weapons systems – in particular Bayraktar drones, already deployed with significant results on the ground by several Sahelian armies – and religious outreach through the Diyanet. The latent conflict between Ankara and Tel Aviv – which, according to several regional security analysts, risks intensifying in 2026 across multiple overlapping theaters, from the Horn of Africa to the eastern Mediterranean, where an Israel-Greece-Cyprus axis has solidified, perceived by Ankara as an encirclement  –  thus extends to the Sahel as well, where Israel is watching Turkish penetration with growing attention and seeking to build its own diplomatic counterweights, even in areas traditionally peripheral to its historical interests.

Ibrahim Traoré’s Burkina Faso, navigating pragmatically between Tehran and Tel Aviv, between Moscow and Beijing, and now attempting to open a channel with Israel just as it severs ties with Paris, is not making an ideological choice, but rather executing a balancing maneuver.

Given this competition – which we can describe as tripolar – for influence in Africa, European foreign ministries are watching with interest the possibility of using Israel as an indirect vehicle to preserve a remnant of influence in areas from which they have been formally expelled. The reasoning is as simple as it is delicate: where a direct French, American, or more generally Western presence is now politically untenable in the eyes of public opinion and the Sahelian governments, a partner like Israel – equipped with advanced technology, unburdened (at least not to the same extent) by the colonial stigma that weighs on Paris, and historically less exposed to the Third World anti-imperialist rhetoric that permeates the public discourse of the new military authorities – could serve as a surrogate channel to maintain access to information and influence in the region, without directly exposing Western interests to the public hostility directed at Paris. This interpretation, persistently promoted in the North African and Middle Eastern press regarding the support of the United Arab Emirates and Morocco for the Israeli-Sahelian rapprochement, raises legitimate questions about the true autonomy of the Israeli diplomatic initiative vis-à-vis the interests of third parties – Abu Dhabi, Rabat, and, indirectly, the European capitals themselves – all of which are interested in preserving channels of observation and influence in a region that is gradually slipping from their direct control.

It remains significant, however, that this interpretation, however plausible, does not fully capture the complexity of the decision made in Ouagadougou. Burkina Faso, like the other members of the AES, faces a jihadist threat that is wresting growing portions of territory from state control, an energy and food supply crisis exacerbated by the regional repercussions of the conflict between Israel, the United States, and Iran, as well as a structural technological deficit that neither Russia – engaged primarily in direct military operations through the Africa Corps – nor China, which focuses mainly on long-term infrastructure investments, can fully address. In this context, Israel possesses certain resources that are difficult to replace: advanced expertise in water resource management in arid and semi-arid environments; precision agriculture technologies capable of mitigating the effects of the food crisis looming for the 2026 agricultural season; surveillance and counterintelligence systems with proven effectiveness against asymmetric insurgencies, as well as decades of experience cooperating with African countries on security force training. For a junta whose political survival depends largely on its ability to demonstrate concrete results in the fight against terrorism and in managing the economic crisis, access to this expertise represents a tangible incentive, regardless of geopolitical exploitation by third parties.

It is also worth highlighting the growing financial appeal of Burkina Faso in the eyes of diverse international partners: the establishment of the Confederal Investment and Development Bank, the pursuit of monetary autonomy from the CFA franc, and, more recently, the country’s accession to the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage – a preliminary step toward the development of a civil nuclear energy program, supported in part by Russian cooperation – signal Ouagadougou’s desire to present itself not merely as a recipient of aid, but as an emerging market with room for expansion for foreign capital and technology, at a time when the redefinition of regional power structures in the Sahel is opening up investment opportunities that traditional Western actors, excluded for political reasons, are no longer able to occupy.

READ: Kevin Barrett: Moroccans are not desperate to flee to Algeria!

Ibrahim Traoré’s Burkina Faso, navigating pragmatically between Tehran and Tel Aviv, between Moscow and Beijing, and now attempting to open a channel with Israel just as it severs ties with Paris, is not making an ideological choice, but rather executing a balancing maneuver typical of a state that, having broken with its historical ally, must necessarily expand its network of partners to avoid finding itself in a state of strategic isolation. Whether Israel will succeed in consolidating this opening into a structured diplomatic and technological presence, or whether it will remain a contingent episode destined to clash with the contradictions inherent in the role – real or presumed – of intermediary for Western interests in Africa, is a question that only the developments of the coming months can resolve.

What is already evident is that the confederal Sahel is, in fact, building an ecosystem of multipolar alliances in which secondary regional actors find room to project their influence in a region that is strategically crucial for controlling migration routes, mineral resources, and the energy balance of the entire sub-Saharan belt.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Maghrebi.org. Lorenzo Maria Pacini is an Associate Professor of Political Philosophy and Geopolitics at UniDolomiti of Belluno. He is also a consultant in Strategic Analysis, Intelligence, and International Relations. This article was originally published by the Strategic Culture Foundation.

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The activities of the second edition of the technical workshop on The Strategic Vision of the National Oil Corporation for the Development of Natural Gas Projects in Libya continued with the aim of developing a roadmap for the development of the gas sector and maximizing the use of Libya’s reserves, as reported by Libya Eye on July 21st. 

The workshop sessions were attended by the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the National Oil Corporation (NOC), Masoud Suleiman, who presented during a dialogue session the strategic vision of the Corporation on the development of gas projects, reviewing the size of Libya’s reservoirs and investment opportunities present in this vital sector for the country. 

Suleiman stressed that the development of gas projects is a major priority for the corporation, due to it playing a role in supporting the national economy, meeting the needs of the local market, all while enhancing cooperation opportunities for international partners and the transferring of modern expertise and technologies to Libya’s oil and gas sector.

During the session, the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Foundation listened to the interventions and questions of experts and representatives of the participating companies, and provided clarifications on the plans and mechanism for the implementation of future projects, stressing that the Corporation will continue to work towards the goal of achieving the greatest potential economic benefit for Libya from its natural resources. 

Dr. Khalifa Abdel Sadiq, a member of the Foundation’s Board of Directors, reviewed the plan for the development of gas projects, and the possibility of implementing them in accordance with specific time programs, as a way to ensure raised production levels and the achievement of strategic goals. 

The National Oil Corporation seeks to strengthen international partnerships through and develop Libya’s infrastructure across its gas sector, in a way that contributes to continued support of the Libyan economy while transforming gas reserves into value-added production projects. 

Libya Eye, Maghrebi.org. 

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Amid rising Middle Eastern tensions, the cost of the US-Israeli war on Iran has been estimated at $37.5 billion so far, according to Al Jazeera and agencies on July 21st.

US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth confirmed this figure during a July 21st Senate appropriations committee hearing.

Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dan Caine were questioned about their request for a $1.5 trillion defence budget, including $70 billion for the war on Iran.

President Donald Trump’s administration had previously estimated the cost at $29 billion in May; the latest estimate is about $8 billion higher.

Democratic Senator Patty Murray questioned the budget request, which also includes funding requests for the National Guard deployment in Washington, DC, US operations against alleged drug smugglers in the Caribbean, and military patrols at the US border.

Murray argued that Hegseth’s “request does not make a lot of sense.”

These figures come amid growing bipartisan opposition to US military aid to Israel over concerns about complicity in war crimes amid Israel’s wars on Gaza, Lebanon and Iran.

Since its establishment in 1948, Israel has received US military and economic support worth over $300 billion.

In May, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called for reducing Israel’s reliance on foreign aid in favour of developing a stronger domestic defence industry.

Accounting for 53% of Israel’s total conventional arms imports since 2023, the US is Israel’s largest arms supplier; Germany covers the remaining 47%.

Following the start of the war on Iran on February 28th, the US approved a $151.8 million munitions sale to Israel, forgoing the mandatory Congressional Review required for large arms sales.

Despite concerns about complicity in war crimes, nations including Britain, France, the Czech Republic, Serbia and Denmark have sought defence cooperation with Israel.

Israel’s defence ties are not limited to the US and Europe, as Morocco, India and Thailand have also established defence cooperation with Israel since 2023.

On June 2nd, Israel’s Defence Ministry announced that arms exports had reached “a record high” in 2025, with Europe being the largest purchaser, accounting for 36% of total imports.

Maghrebi has contacted the US Department of War for comment on Hegseth’s request for a $1.5 trillion defence budget, but has not received a response at the time of publication.

Al Jazeera and agencies, Maghrebi.org

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Mali’s internal strife has escalated once again amid reports that soldiers captured by jihadists have been executed, according to RFI and agencies on July 20th.

JNIM, an al-Qaeda-affiliated jihadist group, summarily executed 18 soldiers following a joint attack with the Tuareg-led Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), Malian security forces confirmed.

On July 18th, a Malian Armed Forces (FAMA) and Russian Africa Corps convoy was ambushed by JNIM and FLA rebels in the northern Gao region’s Tabrichat, as it returned from Anéfis, situated in the Kidal region.

At least 50 soldiers were killed in the attack; images released by JNIM appeared to show unarmed soldiers sitting or lying in the sand, riddled with bullets.

Hamza Ag Iyad, one of JNIM leader Iyad Ag Ghaly’s sons, was reportedly involved in the executions; Mali’s junta announced a $3.5 million reward for information leading to the arrest or killing of Ghaly on June 6th.

FLA rebels have distanced themselves from the executions, saying, “We attacked the same convoy, but each of us on our own side; the groups are not mixed. JNIM executed its own prisoners.”

Despite this, the FLA reportedly captured 20 soldiers during the July 18th ambush.

Tuareg separatists have claimed to hold over 200 FAMA troops captive as “prisoners of war” in Kidal since coordinated attacks in partnership with JNIM on April 25th.

Kidal, a Tuareg stronghold, was recaptured by FLA fighters on April 25th; Malian authorities had previously regained control of the territory in late 2023.

Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane, an FLA spokesperson, stated that “senior officers, non-commissioned officers” were among those held captive.

In an apparent attempt to gain “respectability” in contrast with FAMA and its Russian auxiliaries, the FLA has invited international organisations to verify the troops’ detention conditions in Kidal.

Russian and Malian forces have been implicated in alleged war crimes, including murders of civilians, particularly in the Fulani community, which is persecuted throughout the Sahel over suspected Islamist ties.

The July 18th ambush is not the first time that convoys were attacked; JNIM and FLA militants attacked an army convoy in the northern Tin Araban region on July 9th.

On July 12th, JNIM ambushed another convoy between the central  Niono and Nampala regions.

Before April 25th, FLA rebels attacked military convoys in the Kidal region on February 18th and March 4th.

Tuareg separatists, who receive Ukrainian funding, have waged war against Malian authorities since their latest uprising in 2012; they are fighting for independence over a northern territory they call Azawad.

RFI and agencies, Maghrebi.org

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The Trump administration has asked Congress to approve nearly $41 million to support the reopening of the US Embassy in Libya, marking a major step toward restoring a permanent American diplomatic presence in the country nearly 14 years after the mission was closed, as reported by Libya Review on July 21st. 

According to the Associated Press, the US State Department notified lawmakers on July 21st that the requested funding would cover multiple security-related measures for the gradual resumption of embassy operations in Libya. The intent of the proposal is to support the phased return of American diplomats to Tripoli after years of only having operations in Tunisia and Malta. 

The State Department said reopening the embassy is key in advancing US national security interests. It argued that Washington needs to maintain an active presence within Libya and strategically important regions where rival powers are seeking to expand their influence. The department additionally highlighted Libya’s strategic location on the Mediterranean, its role in global energy markets, regional security, and migration routes, describing Libya as a key component of US interests in North Africa. 

The requested funding follows several high-level meetings between senior US officials and Libyan representatives from both eastern and western Libya. The discussions included talks with Secretary of State Marco Rubio and the President’s Senior Adviser for Arab, Middle Eastern, and African Affairs, Massad Boulos, as Washington continues to pursue diplomatic engagement with Libyan stakeholders. The State Department originally informed Congress in March that it intended to begin preparations for reopening the embassy. However, until now, no dedicated funding had been allocated for the project. 

If the new funding is approved, its primary use will be to strengthen security at the already existing diplomatic office in Tripoli, which only accommodates short-term visits by US diplomats and government officials. By enhancing security infrastructure it is expected that the way will be paved for a gradual return of permanent embassy operations. 

Libya Review, Maghrebi.org.

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Africa’s abortion debate is back in the spotlight as changes to US foreign aid policies raise concerns over the future of reproductive healthcare programmes across the continent. The African Population and Health Research Centre estimate seven deaths a day due to unsafe abortion complications. Kenya is among the countries facing renewed scrutiny over the impact on healthcare providers and vulnerable communities, according to the Associated Press and The Independent on 20 July.

The controversy, just over 4 years of Roe v Wade being overturned by the US Supreme Court, follows Washington’s decision to restrict funding for organisations providing or supporting abortion-related services overseas. This includes programmes supporting maternal care, family planning and healthcare access. Aid organisations warn that reduced support could place additional pressure on already stretched health systems, particularly in communities where women rely heavily on NGO-supported services, with health advocates arguing this leads to many women using unsafe abortions as a direct result of a lack of contraceptive access or education.

At the centre of the debate is the Maputo Protocol, adopted by the African Union in 2003, which commits member states to protecting women’s reproductive rights and improving access to healthcare, including safe abortion in specific circumstances such as rape, incest and where pregnancy threatens a woman’s health. Despite its significance as a regional rights framework, implementation remains uneven across Africa due to differing national laws, political positions and alternate social attitudes. Unsafe abortion remains a major public health concern in parts of Africa, contributing to preventable maternal deaths and placing additional burdens on already fragile healthcare systems. The World Health Organisation has identified unsafe abortion as a significant contributor to maternal mortality where resources are limited.

However, opponents of expanded access argue that abortion laws should remain under national control and reflect domestic cultural, religious and political considerations- a form of cultural relativism. The issue has increasingly become linked to broader politicised debates over sovereignty, with some governments resisting what they view as external influence over domestic policymaking.

Kenya has become a key example of these tensions. While the country has expanded healthcare services in recent years, significant inequalities remain between urban and rural communities. Health organisations have warned that disruptions to international support could disproportionately affect women who face the greatest barriers to accessing medical care.

The debate also highlights Africa’s wider dependence on foreign healthcare funding. International assistance has played an important role in supporting maternal health, HIV prevention and family planning programmes across the continent. However, reliance on external donors has also left some services vulnerable to political changes in donor countries, raising questions about the long-term sustainability of healthcare systems.

The debate therefore extends beyond abortion policy itself, raising wider questions over whether African healthcare systems can build enough resilience to withstand changing international priorities. For many women across the continent, the consequences will ultimately be measured not in political debates, but in access to essential healthcare.

Associated Press, The Independent, Maghrebi.org

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