Hafed Al-Ghwell: How would a 2nd term for Saied look in Tunisia?

As the presidential election in Tunisia approaches, the reelection of Kais Saied seems inevitable. A poll by TunisiaMeters in April 2024 put him in a substantial lead. The prospect of his victory in October portends a deepening of the authoritarian trend that characterized his first five-year term. Under his leadership, Tunisia has undergone significant constitutional changes and a notable concentration of executive power. This concentration of power has been accompanied by the routine use of legal systems and institutions to stifle dissent.

The erosion of civil liberties has sparked localized protests and strikes but they have ultimately failed to prompt any support or notable criticism of the regime from influential world powers such as the US or the EU. As Saied gears up for what seems a likely second term, concerns are growing about further restrictions he might impose on civil society and, in particular, on nonprofit organizations through the introduction of proposed laws governing foreign funding.

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His administration remains cautious of antagonizing the country’s powerful unions, including the Tunisian General Labor Union, which has more than 1 million members in a country with a population of 12 million, but the pushback so far remains limited. Overall, Saied’s strategies seem poised to perpetuate his authoritarian model of governance, extending and tightening his grip on the political landscape while sidelining long-overdue economic reforms and instead leveraging unsustainable foreign funding to ameliorate the ongoing economic crisis in the country.
His tenure has been characterized by constitutional maneuvers bordering on the bizarre, and reactionary governance aimed at consolidating power by scapegoating Tunisia’s “enemies,” real or imagined. To recap, Saied’s self-coup in 2021, followed by his dismissal of the prime minister and dissolution of parliament, laid the groundwork for subsequent actions, such as a constitutional referendum in 2022. Turnout was low, at just over 30 percent, but of those who did vote, nearly 95 percent approved the new constitution.

The president soon expanded his own authority under the revised constitution, which limited parliamentary checks while legislation such as Decree Law 54 provided a legal basis for the arrest of dissenters under the pretext of combating misinformation. He crippled Tunisia’s judiciary by dissolving the High Judicial Court and granting himself the power to dismiss judges, which helped him to further fragment the opposition.

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The prospect of his reelection now looms, bringing with it palpable fears that he might further alter the constitution to extend his presidency, given his lead in polls and an opposition that lacks the unity to mount any effective challenge. It is highly probable he will argue for an extension to his time in office beyond the constitutional limit of two five-year terms by framing his first term, under the old constitution, as separate from the legal framework that is now in place. Alternatively, despite some barriers, constitutional amendments could become a focal point of his agenda if he wins a “majority” of public support at the election.

However, systemic barriers and societal pushback might yet complicate his efforts. The unions, in particular the huge General Labor Union, represent a force even Saied must navigate carefully. The powerful union has demonstrated its ability to organize large-scale strikes and protests, which is a crucial deterrent against more aggressive executive actions. Aside from the arrest of some union leaders, the president has largely avoided a direct confrontation to prevent widespread unrest, and this strategy would likely continue in a second term.

For Tunisians, the prospect of a second Saied term presents a paradox of stability and suppression. The erosion of democratic pluralism is almost complete, as the reality of the constitutional referendum two years ago, and subsequent legal reforms, sinks in.

However, should Tunisia’s economic woes persist, given the high levels of public debt and sluggish growth, it is unlikely Saied would continue to find the room to sidestep the escalating crisis, thus forcing him to implement substantial economic reforms, even if constrained by the influence of the unions.
Opposition from the General Labor Union has so far prevented necessary adjustments such as a lowering of public sector spending on salaries. Consequently, Saied has sought to “buy time” by relying on unsustainable foreign aid from migrant-wary Europe to help prop up an ailing economy that needs reforms more than it needs infusions of funds. Such a delicate balance of power highlights the complex dynamics Saied will face as he enters a second term. Undermining the unions could trigger significant social upheaval, while attempting to appease them might stymie vital economic reforms. It will be a precarious path to navigate and one that could lead him to dig ever deeper into the authoritarian handbook in an effort to maintain a semblance of stability, placate generous European benefactors, achieve his own political goals and, above all, ensure his regime is coup proof.

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Regarding his approach to civil society, Saied is expected to double down on ever more restrictive measures. His proposal to curb the foreign financing of nongovernmental organizations suggests an intent to limit perceived external influences and crack down on potential dissent. Such moves resonate with his base and sections of the Islamist vote that view foreign interventions with suspicion. However, the strategies hint at a further slide into authoritarianism, undermining the civil liberties that were hallmarks of Tunisia’s otherwise turbulent post-Arab Spring era.

The methods Saied has employed included politicizing the military, which was once staunchly neutral, thereby guaranteeing, through civilian oversight mechanisms, its support for his consolidation of power. But such political instrumentalization hinders the separation of powers that is essential for a healthy democracy. It is not difficult to see why the Tunisian military might prefer to side with Saied during his second term. Historically marginalized, the armed forces have gained unprecedented perks under his rule, including prominent ministerial roles and leadership positions in major public health efforts.
Such institutional and personal incentives suggest a strategic alignment rather than mere coercion. Moreover, the relatively weak and apolitical nature of the Tunisian military means it is more susceptible to simply following orders that might seem undemocratic, driven by a professional ethos that prioritizes obedience over constitutional scrutiny.

This deference to civilian leadership, which paradoxically is intended to prevent military overreach, creates fertile ground for Saied’s autocratic approach. While Tunisia’s economic crisis and governmental inefficiencies exacerbate the context in which it operates, the military’s newfound status and the roles it is afforded under his tenure provide a compelling reason for continuing allegiance, even as democratic norms are eroded.

For Tunisians, the prospect of a second Saied term presents a paradox of stability and suppression. The erosion of democratic pluralism is almost complete, as the reality of the constitutional referendum two years ago, and subsequent legal reforms, sinks in. It marks an irreversible shift away from the aspirations that toppled the previous regime, and the idealism that followed.

While Saied’s strong grip on power might offer a semblance of order amid the economic challenges, it portends endless limits on personal freedoms and on those political institutions that survive. The faith of Tunisians in democracy has been tested to the limits and it is likely that a second Saied term would relegate once resilient ideals to the status of distant memories. Any likelihood of reviving similar aspirations appears dim, suffocated by a web of resurgent authoritarianism, international ambivalence, and societal fragmentation.

Hafed Al-Ghwell is a senior fellow and executive director of the North Africa Initiative at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC. X: @HafedAlGhwell