Sami Hamdi: Trump relations with Algeria and Morocco
One of Trump’s final moves of his first term was to announce US recognition of Moroccan “sovereignty” over the Western Sahara. The announcement was part of a transactional bilateral agreement whereby Morocco would normalise ties with Israel.
However, from Morocco’s perspective, the agreement was about more than just an announcement of US recognition. Normalisation with Israel was supposed to be in exchange for proactive support for Morocco’s assertion of control over the Western Sahara. Instead, Rabat was bitterly disappointed that the words were not followed by any serious action.
Trump lost the elections very soon afterwards, and the then-incoming Joe Biden decided to halt any advance on the Western Sahara issue in a bid to avoid provoking Algeria and open a new confrontation in North Africa. Although Biden did not reverse the recognition, he rendered it hollow by sending a flurry of diplomats to Algeria to reassure them that that no further action would be taken on the issue of recognition.
Moreover, Israel itself failed to fulfil its promise to lobby Washington on Morocco’s behalf. Rabat’s normalisation with Israel had little do with any love for Israel or its future. Instead, the decision to normalise had more to do with the prevalent view in the region that “Israel is the key to the White House and Congress”. Instead, Israel began to add more conditions.
Morocco responded angrily and hinted that it might reverse normalisation if it did not start seeing traction. Fearing that such a move might start a domino of reversals, or even deter others, Israel responded by announcing its own recognition of Moroccan control of Western Sahara with a promise to do more to lobby Washington.
With Trump beginning his second term, there are questions as to how he might approach Morocco and Algeria.
Morocco has remained firm on its relations with Israel and has expanded its economic and trade ties despite popular opposition domestically. Policymakers counter domestic opposition by insisting that normalisation is tied to Western Sahara. The latter remains an issue that evokes strong emotions in Morocco.
Although the artificially manufactured connection between the two issues was considered effective enough for even an Islamist Prime Minister to agree to sign the normalisation agreement, the genocide that Israel has perpetrated in Gaza has made it difficult to maintain the link between the two issues. Normalisation has neither brought international recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, nor has it brought any benefit at all to the Palestinians.
Nevertheless, Rabat has given very little indication that it has given up on the potential benefits of normalisation. With Trump returning to the White House, there is an expectation in Rabat that the returning President will make good on his promise regarding the Western Sahara. However, such a belief may be misguided this time.
For starters, Trump’s foreign policy remains unclear, even for Israel. Where Israel thought Trump would let them continue the genocide in Gaza after his appointment of one of the most ostensibly Zionist-leaning cabinets in US history, he has instead opted to bully Netanyahu into a ceasefire that neither Netanyahu nor any of the Israeli ruling coalition want. Israeli analysts who campaigned for Trump area already lamenting that Trump has betrayed them, and Trump’s recent appointment of Defence officials who have been openly critical of Israel has raised alarm among Israeli allies.
The immediate confrontation between Trump and Netanyahu suggests that Israel may not be able to hold the sway over the US President in the manner that Rabat envisages. This would mean that the whole basis of normalisation whereby Israel sways Washington is now in question.
This problem is compounded by the possibility that Trump could punish any bid to reverse normalisation that Rabat might embark on to assert leverage, meaning Rabat would find itself stuck between a domestic population that views normalisation as full-on treachery with no Western Sahara to show for it, and a White House that threatens repercussions without any promise of benefit.
Moreover, Trump may not be in a rush to antagonise Morocco’s neighbour Algeria. In October 2020, Trump sent his Defence Secretary Mark Esper to Algiers in a rare visit by a senior US official to explore expansion of ties. The crisis in Libya also remains unresolved where Turkiye, Russia, UAE, and Qatar all continue to wrestle over the country’s future. Algeria, which shares a border with Libya, has been courted by all of the parties involved, including the US. With Russia considered to be the dominant influence in eastern Libya, US policymakers may find it ill-advised to alienate Algeria on the western side and risk pushing Algiers closer to Moscow.
“The immediate confrontation between Trump and Netanyahu suggests that Israel may not be able to hold the sway over the US President in the manner that Rabat envisages. This would mean that the whole basis of normalisation whereby Israel sways Washington is now in question”
Furthermore, unlike Trump’s first term where Morocco’s close Gulf ally in Abu Dhabi was the primary Arab influence over US foreign policy, Qatar and Turkiye have caught up after having learnt the lessons of the first term. Qatar has just brokered Trump’s Gaza ceasefire while prominent Republicans have asserted the importance of listening to Turkish President Erdogan on regional matters. Both Qatar and Turkiye view Algeria as an important ally.
READ: CIA updates Morocco map to include Western Sahara
Erdogan has sought to woo Algiers on multiple occasions to facilitate the expansion of Turkiye’s influence in Africa, while Algiers has quietly approved of Erdogan’s intervention in Libya to drive back Khalifa Haftar’s UAE and Russia-backed forces. Moreover, Algeria’s President Abdel-Majid Tebboune has been loud in his criticism of Morocco’s ally UAE. Although Algeria does not invest heavily in lobbying in any capital in the world, it can reasonably expect Turkish and Qatari lobbies to counter heavily pro-Moroccan UAE lobbies.
This means that Algeria has two conduits of influence towards Trump that have the potential to temper any support from Washington for Morocco.
READ: Sami Hamdi: Israel humours Morocco as Biden woos Algeria
Yet Rabat may not be gambling entirely on Trump this time. France’s Macron has been desperate in recent times to reassert French influence in Africa after a spectacular reversal in a host of Francophone countries that has prompted the French President to call African leaders “ungrateful”. In October 2024, Macron told Morocco’s parliament that Western Sahara should be under Moroccan control and that France would invest in the area as an act of recognition. Spain has reaffirmed its support for recognition as well, while efforts are being in the UK parliament to push the government to follow US, Israeli, Spanish, and French recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.
However, with Russia pressuring from the East, and Trump antagonising from the West, the EU may deem it counterproductive to be drawn into a clash between two Mediterranean powers that might directly affect energy security (Algeria is the third largest gas supplier to Europe), migration, and trade.
READ: Biden camp again involved in Western Sahara feud
Rabat may believe there is a chance to force the issue. However, Trump may not be the catalyst that the Moroccan government wants him to be, and Algeria still remains a regional powerhouse to be courted by international powers despite its domestic setbacks.
Sami Hamdi is the Managing Director of the International Interest, a global risk and intelligence company. He advises governments on the geopolitical dynamics of Europe and the MENA region, and has significant expertise in advising companies on commercial issues related to volatile political environments and their implications on market entry, market expansion, and managing of stakeholders. Sami is also featured as a commentator for Aljazeera (Arabic and English), Sky News, BBC, TRT World, and other outlets.