Libya’s subtle involvement in Sudan civil war

Since civil war began in Sudan in April 2023, the potential for the conflict to affect the region has grown. In the years since Sudan has been embroiled in civil war, neighbouring countries have suffered the consequences of a region further destabilised. The two countries have historically not only shared a border across the Sahara but have also shared data in order to facilitate the return of Sudanese mercenaries from Libyan territory and to aid commercial trade. The civil war in Sudan has not only thrown the country into chaos, leading to the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, but has also threatened to destabilise the region. External actors including Egypt and the UAE have been fundamental to supporting the two opposing sides in Sudan. However, as the war shows no signs of abating, the risk of further regional involvement becomes ever more likely. 

On June 11th, Sudan’s paramilitary rebel group Rapid Support Forces (RSF) claimed that their fighters had seized a strategic zone on the border with Egypt and Libya. Such claims came in the wake of the Strategic Armed Forces (SAF) announcing that they had retreated from the area. SAF are backed by the Sudanese government and have been engaged in conflict with the RSF rebels for over two years. But such a retreat from SAF and advance from the RSF suggests a pivotal change in the border region. As well as retreating, SAF have accused Libyan commander Khalifa Haftar of launching a cross-border attack alongside the RSF which, if true, would signal the first direct Libyan involvement in the civil war. 

However, according to Roberta Maggi, a development practitioner and associate fellow at CARPO, the threat of escalation between the two conflicts is more nuanced. Rather than Sudan destabilising Libya, she argues that Libya, through Haftar’s alignment with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), is helping to prolong Sudan’s conflict. “Haftar’s LAAF has a longstanding relationship with the UAE, who extended their support further south to the point of giving the RSF military leverage in their quest for control,” she said. “It is precisely because of the presence of Haftar to the north, and the ability to be able to call on his support if needed, that the RSF threat is difficult to subside for the Sudanese Armed Forces, and easy to continue supporting for the UAE.”

The RSF’s continued strength lies partly in this regional support. Maggi points to the geopolitical significance of Sudan to outside actors like the UAE, particularly in maintaining access to the Horn of Africa on their own terms. Still, while Haftar’s support for the RSF is notable, Maggi does not see the Sudanese conflict as necessarily reshaping Libya’s own internal political balance. Libya remains caught in a delicate standoff between the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity and Haftar’s forces in the east. The country’s internal ceasefire is fragile, and recent violence in the capital has underlined just how quickly conditions can deteriorate. On May 13th, Tripoli was rocked by clashes after the commander of the Support Force Apparatus (SSA), a government-backed militia based in Abu Salim, was killed. Armed groups mobilised in the densely populated district, prompting fears of a return to full-scale conflict.

Despite this volatility, Maggi maintains that the impact of Sudan’s war on Libya’s political landscape has been overstated. “I don’t necessarily see a heightened risk of shifting balances of power in Libya because of events in Sudan at present,” she said. “While the mercenary question still looms… ongoing dynamics in Libya speak to a mix of local dynamics and great power competition, more so than the affairs of Libya’s neighbours.”

Indeed, Libya’s entanglement with Sudan’s rebel groups predates the current conflict. The LAAF has previously received support from factions such as the Sudan Liberation Army Minni Minawi and the Gathering of the Sudan Liberation Forces. Although these fighters were expected to leave Libya following the 2020 ceasefire agreement, the withdrawal has yet to be fully realised. Their presence illustrates how intertwined these regional conflicts have become, with fighters, funding, and influence crossing borders as easily as arms and contraband.

The RSF’s latest claim to have seized control of a key border zone with Egypt and Libya has attracted attention, but Maggi cautions against overstating its strategic value. “Any territorial seizure of key areas such as borders gives the actor a certain leverage,” she said. “However, given how porous the borders are with both Libya and Egypt, this seizure needs to be recontextualised.” She points out that while the RSF may control terrain, it lacks international recognition and broad popular support within Sudan which are two fundamental ingredients for political stability.

As things currently stand, Haftar’s involvement appears limited to cross-border activity. Maggi does not believe the LAAF will become directly engaged in Sudan beyond the frontier. “Their involvement at the border is a natural by-product of their handling of border patrols along the Sudanese border,” she explained. “Going beyond the border would be strategically unsound, as the LAAF Central Command needs to consolidate its assets internally first and foremost.” Libya’s own instability and the need to maintain control of its southern territories make a deeper intervention unlikely—at least in the short term.

Still, the risk of Sudan becoming a proxy battleground remains nonetheless. Egypt and the UAE have already played indirect roles in supporting the warring factions, and other regional players may follow. “There is always a chance—not least amid a growing global context of battle for resources, and given Sudan’s strategic position bridging North and the Horn of Africa,” Maggi said. But she also noted that foreign involvement need not be overt to be influential. “I would question your notion that financial support isn’t a direct form of involvement. For the large part in Libya, that’s the kind of proxy support we have seen.”

As Sudan’s war shows no sign of abating, its regional repercussions remain fluid. For Libya, a country already teetering on the edge of renewed conflict, the danger lies not only in cross-border attacks but in the slow, corrosive effects of foreign entanglement and proxy alliances. The battle for Sudan may not yet be Libya’s war but it risks being increasingly shaped by Libyan actors.

Roberta Maggi/ CARPO/ Maghrebi/ Al Jazeera