Eddie Monkman: Libyan politics is about personalities, not policies

If you want to try and begin to understand how Libyan politics works then it is important to refrain from applying a western, democratic framework. As published in the Libya Gazette, Libya’s politics are lived and decided in family networks, and the small rituals of respect and rank that govern who is trusted and who is not. Status can be more important than policies and in Libya, the enduring fact is personal: one death, one exile, one changed allegiance and the map of power can tilt overnight.

That is not a dramatic formulation of political science but rather it is a description of lived reality. The country’s institutions gain their strength and recognition from those in positions of power who work within them and where institutions fail, individuals step into the void. Legitimacy in many parts of Libya is not won at the ballot box; it is conferred by lineage, reputation and the tacit recognition of influential families and tribal leaders. As many analysts have noted, the post-2011 fragmentation reflected the absence of a functioning state as much as any ideology, producing local orders built around relationships rather than rules.

An analysis of the cultural architecture can help explain otherwise puzzling things to outsiders. A name can be a political asset: “Ben” (son of) or belonging to certain families still carries social capital and a presumption of authority. Suspicion of unknown names or outsiders and of those who cannot be placed in a network is part of the political framework. That suspicion is why foreign diplomats who arrive with policy playbooks but no interlocutors can quickly find that their plans fail and have been the downfall of many western envoys who have failed to reckon with the specificities of Libyan politics. External actors routinely misread Libya when they assume the country will respond to incentives the way state-centric models predict; instead, they encounter an ecosystem where personal loyalties, long memories and local bargains matter far more.

This is also why individuals can matter more than movements or political ideologies. The fall or defection of a single commander, politician or businessman often reshapes alliances and reverses fortunes. Khalifa Haftar’s advances, for instance, were as much about the loyalties he could secure among commanders and tribes as about any sweeping political programme. Likewise, Tripoli’s fortunes have hinged on figures who could marshal fighters, money and family ties. Follow the man, not just his policy. Following the motives, the patronage and the fear that travel with his name will tell you where the country is likely to go next.

Foreign influence in Libya is often caricatured as a binary contest between NATO-style West versus Moscow or Ankara. The reality is messier. Russia’s footprint military advisers, private contractors and political outreach is real, but several Libya specialists have stressed it should be seen as one lever among many and not an all-defining force. At the same time Turkey has built deep ties on the ground: its 2019 intervention decisively altered the balance in favour of Tripoli and made Ankara an indispensable power broker in western Libya. The lesson for observers is simple: identify the patrons and the patrons’ local clients; that is the only way to interpret the chessboard.

Don’t assume the ballot settles legitimacy. Elections, when they occur, are only one performance of legitimacy in a crowded field that includes militia commanders, tribal councils and external patrons. The people most enthusiastic about democracy are often those who stand to win from it. Libya’s politics are not chaotic because Libyans are irrational; they are personalised because, in the vacuum left by a collapsed state, human networks are a viable mechanism for ordering social life. If one wants to understand Libya and wants to write about it responsibly the one must adjust their lens accordingly. Watch the individuals. Decode their motives. And remember that in Libya, the next chapter almost always turns on the life of a person, not the ink of a policy.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Maghrebi.org.

Eddie Monkman is a Maghrebi journalist and editor of The Libya Gazette.